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1 Introduction
According to the classic work by Marshall (1920), agglomeration of economic activity is
beneficial in three different dimensions, as it reduces transportation costs for accessing
a wide range of goods, people, and ideas (see Ellison et al., 2010). The new economic
geography (neg), due to the pioneering work by Krugman (1991), focuses on the first
mechanism: trade frictions for shipping goods across cities induce consumers and firms
to spatially concentrate in order to take advantage of large local markets. Yet, a long
literature in urban economics, dating back to Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969),
emphasizes that such a concentration generates urban frictions within cities – people
spend a lot of time on commuting and pay high land rents.
This fundamental trade-off between agglomeration and dispersion forces has been
studied for decades. Among others, Fujita et al. (1999) and Fujita and Thisse (2002)
analyze how firms and workers choose their locations depending on the magnitudes
of – and changes in – spatial frictions. However, little is known about the quantitative
importance of urban and trade frictions in shaping the spatial economy. To what extent
do spatial frictions matter for the city-size distribution? By how much do they affect
individual city sizes? To what degree do they contribute to the productivity advantage of
large cities and the toughness of competition in cities?
Answering these questions is difficult for at least two reasons. First, one needs a spatial
model with costly trade and commuting, featuring endogenous location decisions. To
investigate the productivity advantage of large cities and the toughness of competition in
cities, productivity and markups also need to be endogenous and responsive to changes
in spatial frictions. Second, to perform counterfactual analysis aimed at quantifying the
importance of those frictions, one must keep track of all general equilibrium interactions
when taking the model structurally to the data. To the best of our knowledge, there exist
to date no spatial models dealing jointly with these difficulties.
We develop a multi-city general equilibrium model to fill this gap. Our tractable
model features endogenous productivity and markups, in line with recent approaches to
monopolistic competition for a single economy or a multi-region economy without labor
mobility (Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Behrens et al., 2014; Dhingra and Morrow, 2014). Unlike
these studies, however, we develop a spatial framework where workers are mobile so that
city sizes respond to changes in urban and trade frictions. More specifically, holding the
population distribution across cities first fixed, falling trade costs or urban costs affect
productivity and markups, as well as wages, in all locations. These changes, in turn,
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generate utility differences across cities, thus affecting individual location decisions and
hence city sizes. Shocks to spatial frictions thus induce tougher competition and firm
selection, as emphasized in the recent trade literature, and trigger population movements,
as highlighted in urban economics and the neg.
To build intuition we first consider an example with two cities, as is standard in the
neg literature. We find that, other things equal, the larger city has a higher average pro-
ductivity and a lower average markup than the smaller city. Starting from such an initial
spatial equilibrium, we then conduct two comparative static exercises which correspond
to the counterfactual experiments in the quantitative analysis: “no urban frictions”, i.e.,
a hypothetical scenario where commuting within cities is costless and land rents there-
fore play no role; and “no trade frictions”, i.e., when shipping goods is not more costly
across than within cities. In the former case, we find that the large city tends to become
even larger, because the main congestion force disappears. This, in turn, magnifies the
productivity advantage and the tougher competition there. By contrast, in the latter case,
we find that the large city tends to become smaller, because local market access no longer
matters, and that the small city catches up in terms of productivity and competition.
We quantify our framework with data for 356 us metropolitan statistical areas (msas)
in 2007 and then conduct two counterfactual experiments. First, we consider a scenario
with no commuting costs and land rents. Second, we analyze a scenario where consumers
face the same trade costs for local and non-local products. In both cases, we compare the
actual and the counterfactual equilibria to assess the quantitative importance of spatial
frictions for the city-size distribution, individual city sizes, as well as productivity and
markups in cities. Those counterfactuals are meaningful as they provide bounds that
suggest to what extent the us economic geography is affected by urban and trade costs.
What are our main quantitative findings? First, neither type of frictions significantly
affects the us city-size distribution. Even in a world where urban or trade frictions are
eliminated for all cities, that distribution would still follow the rank-size rule also known
as Zipf’s law. Second, eliminating spatial frictions would change individual city sizes
within the stable distribution. Without urban frictions, large congested cities would gain,
while small isolated cities would lose population – a pattern in line with the intuition of
the two-city example. For instance, the size of New York would increase by 8.5%, i.e., its
size is limited by 8.5% by the presence of urban frictions. By contrast, in a world without
trade frictions, large cities would shrink compared to small cities as local market access
no longer matters. For example, the size of New York would decrease by 10.8%, i.e.,
its size is boosted by 10.8% by the presence of trade frictions. Turning to productivity
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and competition, eliminating trade frictions would lead to aggregate productivity gains
of 68% and markup reductions of 40%, both of which are highly unevenly distributed
across msas. Eliminating urban frictions generates smaller productivity gains up to 1.4%.
Still it leads to a notable markup reduction of about 10% in the aggregate, but again with
a lot of variation across msas. Summing up, our counterfactual analysis suggests that
spatial frictions do not matter for the city-size distribution, they do matter for individual
city sizes, and they matter differently for productivity and competition across cities.
To check the robustness of our results, we first extend – following Combes et al. (2012b) –
the model to encompass external agglomeration economies that affect the productivity
advantage of large cities in addition to firm selection.1 We then deal with potential biases
when estimating how individuals’ location decisions are affected by changes in spatial
frictions. In both cases, the key qualitative and quantitative results remain unchanged:
the city-size distribution is fairly stable when spatial frictions are eliminated, and produc-
tivity and markup changes are very similar to those in our benchmark.
Our analysis contributes to the empirical urban economics and neg literatures and
provides a structural estimation of an urban system model with costly trade across cities
and costly commuting within cities. The quantified model allows us to assess the general
equilibrium impacts of spatial frictions on city sizes, productivity, and markups. We
therefore add to the recent works by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), Ahlfeldt et al.
(2015), and Brinkman et al. (2015), who also adopt a structural approach.2 The latter
two papers focus on the internal structure of a single city, however, whereas the former
paper assumes that trade between cities is costless. Our framework is also related to
recent quantitative trade and geography models following the seminal contribution by
Eaton and Kortum (2002). That literature, which includes Combes and Lafourcade (2011),
Corcos et al. (2012), Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Behrens et al. (2014), Holmes and Stevens
(2014), and Monte et al. (2015), among others, has abstracted either from population
movements across locations or from endogenous markups due to constant elasticity of
substitution (ces) preferences.
1The empirical findings by Combes et al. (2012b) suggest that the productivity advantage of large
cities is mainly due to such agglomeration externalities. Their results, however, rely on two identifying
assumptions: a common productivity distribution for entrants in all cities; and no income effects, which
allow for the separability of agglomeration and selection effects. In our model, there are both income effects
and different productivity distributions for entrants across cities. Thus, our predictions are not comparable
to theirs. In particular, it is a priori unclear whether agglomeration economies are more important than
selection effects once income effects and city-specific productivity distributions are taken into account.
2See Holmes and Sieg (2015) for a recent survey on structural estimation in urban economics.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the basic model,
and then analyze the equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 describes our quantification
procedure and discusses the model fit. We turn to our counterfactual experiments and
examine the robustness of our main results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Several
proofs and details about our model and quantification procedure are relegated to the
appendix.
2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of K cities, with Lr identical workers/consumers
in city r = 1, 2, : : : ,K. Labor is the only factor of production. In this section, we consider
consumers’ utility maximization and firms’ expected profit maximization, given city sizes
Lr. In Section 3, we turn to the market equilibrium holding city sizes constant, and then
analyze the spatial equilibrium in which city sizes are endogenously determined.
2.1 Preferences and demands
There is a final consumption good, provided as a continuum of horizontally differentiated
varieties. Consumers have identical preferences that display ‘love of variety’ and give rise
to demands with variable elasticity. Let psr(i) and qsr(i) denote the price and the per
capita consumption of variety i when it is produced in city s and consumed in city r.
Following Behrens and Murata (2007) and Behrens et al. (2014) the utility maximization
problem of a representative consumer in city r is given by:
max
qsr(j), j2
sr
Ur å
s
Z

sr

1  e qsr(j)dj s.t. å
s
Z

sr
psr(j)qsr(j)dj = Er, (1)
where 
sr denotes the endogenously determined set of varieties produced in s and con-
sumed in r, and where Er denotes consumption expenditure. Solving (1) yields the
following demand functions:
qsr(i) =
Er
N crpr
  1


ln

psr(i)
N crpr

+ r

, 8i 2 
sr, (2)
where N cr is the mass of varieties consumed in city r, and
pr 
1
N cr
å
s
Z

sr
psr(j)dj and r   å
s
Z

sr
ln

psr(j)
N crpr

psr(j)
N crpr
dj
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denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution, respec-
tively.3 Since marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded, the demand for a variety
need not be positive. Indeed, as can be seen from (2), the demand for a local variety i
(respectively, a non-local variety j) is positive if and only if the price of variety i (variety j)
is lower than the reservation price pdr . Formally,
qrr(i) > 0 () prr(i) < pdr and qsr(j) > 0 () psr(j) < pdr ,
where pdr  N crpreEr/(Ncrpr) r depends on the price aggregates pr and r. The definition
of the reservation price allows us to express the demands for local and non-local varieties
concisely as follows:
qrr(i) =
1

ln

pdr
prr(i)

and qsr(j) =
1

ln

pdr
psr(j)

. (3)
Observe that the price elasticity of demand is given by 1/[qrr(i)] for variety i, and
respectively, by 1/[qsr(j)] for variety j. Thus, if individuals consume more of those
varieties, which is for instance the case when their expenditure increases, they become
less price sensitive. Last, since e qsr(j) = psr(j)/pdr , the indirect utility in city r is given by
Ur = N
c
r  å
s
Z

sr
psr(j)
pdr
dj = N cr

1  pr
pdr

, (4)
which we use to compute the equilibrium utility in the subsequent analysis.
2.2 Technology and market structure
Prior to production, firms decide in which city they enter and engage in research and
development. The labor market in each city is perfectly competitive, so that all firms take
the wage rate wr as given. Entry in city r requires a fixed amount F of labor paid at the
market wage. Each firm i that enters in city r discovers its marginal labor requirement
mr(i)  0 only after making this irreversible entry decision. We assume that mr(i) is
drawn from a known, continuously differentiable distribution Gr.4 We introduce trade
3As shown in Reza (1994, pp.278-279), the differential entropy takes its maximum value when there is
no dispersion, i.e., psr(i) = pr for all i 2 
sr for all s. In that case, we would observe r =   ln(1/Ncr ) and
thus qsr(i) = Er/(Ncrpr) by (2). Behrens and Murata (2007, 2012a,b) focus on such a symmetric case. In
contrast, this paper considers firm heterogeneity, so that not only the average price pr but the entire price
distribution matter for the demand qsr(i). The differential entropy r captures the latter price dispersion.
4Differences in Gr across cities thus reflect production amenities such as local knowledge that are not
transferable across space. Firms take those differences into account when making their entry decisions.
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frictions into our model by assuming that shipments from city r to city s are subject to
trade costs rs  1 for all r and s, which firms incur in terms of labor. Since entry costs
are sunk, firms will survive (i.e., operate) provided they can charge prices prs(i) above
marginal costs rsmr(i)wr in at least one city. The surviving firms operate in the same
city where they enter.
We assume that product markets are segmented, i.e., resale or third-party arbitrage is
sufficiently costly, so that firms are free to price discriminate between cities. The operating
profit of a firm i located in city r is then as follows:
r(i) =å
s
rs(i) =å
s
Lsqrs(i) [prs(i)  rsmr(i)wr] , (5)
where qrs(i) is given by (3). Each surviving firm maximizes (5) with respect to its prices
prs(i) separately. Since there is a continuum of firms, no individual firm has any impact
on pdr , so that the first-order conditions for (operating) profit maximization are given by:
ln

pds
prs(i)

=
prs(i)  rsmr(i)wr
prs(i)
, 8i 2 
rs. (6)
A price distribution satisfying (6) is called a price equilibrium. Equations (3) and (6) imply
that qrs(i) = (1/)[1   rsmr(i)wr/prs(i)]. Thus, the minimum output that a firm in
market r may sell in market s is given by qrs(i) = 0 at prs(i) = rsmr(i)wr. This, by (6),
implies that prs(i) = pds . Hence, a firm located in r with draw mxrs  pds/(rswr) is just
indifferent between selling and not selling to s, whereas all firms in r with draws below
mxrs are productive enough to sell to s. In what follows, we refer to mxss  mds as the
internal cutoff in city s, whereas mxrs with r 6= s is the external cutoff. External and internal
cutoffs are linked as follows:5
mxrs =
ss
rs
ws
wr
mds . (7)
Given those cutoffs and a mass of entrants NEr in city r, only N
p
r = NEr Gr (maxs fmxrsg)
firms survive, namely those which are productive enough to sell at least in one market
(which need not be their local market). The mass of varieties consumed in city r is then
N cr =å
s
NEs Gs(m
x
sr), (8)
5Expression (7) reveals an interesting relationship of how trade costs and wage differences affect firms’
abilities to break into different markets. In particular, when wages are equalized across cities (wr = ws) and
internal trade is costless (ss = 1), all external cutoffs must fall short of the internal cutoffs since rs > 1.
Breaking into market s is then always harder for firms in r 6= s than for local firms in s, which is the
standard case in the firm heterogeneity literature (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). However,
in the presence of wage differences and internal trade costs, the internal cutoff need not be larger than the
external cutoff in equilibrium. The usual ranking mds > mxrs prevails only when ssws < rswr.
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which is the sum of all firms that are productive enough to sell to market r.
Since all firms in each city differ only by their marginal labor requirements, we can
express all firm-level variables in terms ofm. Specifically, solving (6) by using the Lambert
W function, defined as ' = W (')eW ('), the profit-maximizing prices and quantities, as
well as operating profits, are given by:6
prs(m) =
rsmwr
W
, qrs(m) =
1

(1 W ) , rs(m) = Lsrsmwr

(W 1 +W   2), (9)
whereW denotes the LambertW function with argument em/mxrs, which we suppress to
alleviate notation. SinceW (0) = 0,W (e) = 1 andW 0 > 0 for all non-negative arguments,
we have 0  W  1 for 0  m  mxrs. The expressions in (9) show that a firm in r
with a draw mxrs charges a price equal to marginal cost, faces zero demand, and earns
zero operating profits in market s. Furthermore, using the properties of W 0, we readily
obtain @prs(m)/@m > 0, @qrs(m)/@m < 0, and @rs(m)/@m < 0. In words, firms with
higher productivity (lower m) charge lower prices, sell larger quantities, and earn higher
operating profits. These properties are similar to those of the Melitz (2003) model with
ces preferences. Yet, our specification with variable demand elasticity also features higher
markups for more productive firms. Indeed, the markup for a firm located in city r and
a consumer located in city s,
rs(m)  prs(m)
rsmwr
=
1
W
, (10)
implies that @rs(m)/@m < 0. Unlike Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), who use quasi-linear
preferences, we incorporate this feature into a full-fledged general equilibrium model
with income effects for varieties.
2.3 Urban structure
Each city consists of a large amount of land that stretches out on a two-dimensional
featureless plane. Land is used for housing only. Each agent consumes inelastically one
unit of land, and the amount of land available at each location is set to one. All firms in
city r are located at a dimensionless Central Business District (cbd). A monocentric city
of size Lr then covers the surface of a disk with radius xr 
p
Lr/, with the cbd located
in the middle of that disk and the workers evenly distributed within it.
We introduce urban frictions in a standard way into our model by assuming that agents
commute to the cbd for work. In particular, we assume that each individual in city r is
6Further details about the Lambert W function, the technical properties of which are key to making our
model tractable, can be found in appendices A and B.
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endowed with hr hours of time, which is the gross labor supply per capita in hours,
including commuting time. Commuting costs are of the ‘iceberg’ type: the effective labor
supply of a worker living at a distance xr  xr from the cbd is given by
sr(xr) = hre rxr , (11)
where r  0 captures the time loss due to commuting and thus measures the commuting
technology of city r.7 The total effective labor supply at the cbd is then given by
Sr =
Z xr
0
2xrsr(xr)dxr =
2hr
2r
h
1 

1+ r
p
Lr/

e r
p
Lr/
i
. (12)
Define the effective labor supply per capita as hr  Sr/Lr, which is the average number of
hours worked in city r. It directly follows from (12) that Sr is positive and increasing in
Lr, while hr is decreasing in Lr: given gross labor supply per capita hr and commuting
technology r > 0, the effective labor supply per capita is lower in a larger city.8 We
can further show that @hr/@r < 0. The effective labor supply per capita is lower, ceteris
paribus, the more severe the urban frictions are in city r, that is, the worse the commuting
technology is. Notice that with r = 0 we would have hr = hr for all Lr workers.
Since firms locate at the cbd, the wage income net of commuting costs earned by a
worker residing at the city edge is wrsr(xr) = wrhre rxr . Because workers are identical,
the wages net of commuting costs and land rents are equalized across all locations in the
city: wrsr(xr) Rr(xr) = wrsr(xr) Rr(xr), where Rr(xr) is the land rent at a distance xr
from the cbd. The equilibrium land rent schedule is then given by Rr (xr) = wr(e rxr  
e rxr)hr +Rr(xr), which yields the following aggregate land rents:
ALRr =
Z xr
0
2xrRr (xr)dxr =
2wrhr
2r

1 

1+ rxr +
2rx
2
r
2

e rxr

+LrRr(xr). (13)
We assume that each worker in city r owns an equal share of the land in that city,
and thus receives an equal share of aggregate land rents. Furthermore, each worker
has an equal claim to aggregate profits r in the respective city. Accordingly, the per
7We use an exponential commuting cost since a linear specification, as in, e.g., Murata and Thisse (2005),
is subject to a boundary condition to ensure positive effective labor supply at each location in the city.
Keeping track of this condition becomes tedious with multiple cities and intercity movements of people.
The exponential specification has been used extensively in the literature (e.g., Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg,
2002), and the convexity of the time loss with respect to distance from the cbd can also be justified in a
modal choice framework of intra-city transportation (e.g., Glaeser, 2008, pp.24–25).
8Here we abstract from an “urban rat race” in larger cities. However, when quantifying the model in
Section 4, we use data on hr across msas, which shows that hr is higher in big cities like New York.
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capita expenditure which consists of the wage net of commuting costs and land rents,
plus a share of aggregate land rents and profits, is then given by Er = wrhre r
p
Lr/  
Rr(xr) +ALRr/Lr +r/Lr = wrhr +r/Lr.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we first analyze the market equilibrium in the single city case. We then
turn to the case with multiple cities. In the latter case, we consider the market equilib-
rium given city sizes, and then analyze the spatial equilibrium in which city sizes are
endogenously determined.
3.1 Single city case
To illustrate how our model works, we first consider the case of a single city. There are
two equilibrium conditions in that case: zero expected profits; and labor market clearing.
These two conditions can be solved for the internal cutoff md and the mass of entrants
NE , which completely characterize the market equilibrium. For notational convenience,
we drop the subscript r and normalize the internal trade costs to one.
Using (5) and (9), the zero expected profit (zep) condition
R md
0 (m)dG(m) = Fw can
be rewritten as:
L

Z md
0
m(W 1 +W   2)dG(m) = F , (14)
which is a function of md only and yields a unique equilibrium cutoff because the left-
hand side of (14) is shown to be strictly increasing in md from 0 to ¥. Furthermore, using
(9), the labor market clearing (lmc) condition, NE [L
R md
0 mq(m)dG(m) + F ] = S, can be
expressed as follows:
NE
"
L

Z md
0
m (1 W )dG(m) + F
#
= S, (15)
which can be uniquely solved for NE given the cutoff md obtained from (14).9
As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and many other existing studies, we choose a par-
ticular distribution function for firms’ productivity draws, 1/m, namely a Pareto distri-
bution: G(m) = (m/mmax)k, where mmax > 0 and k  1 are the exogenous upper bound
9From the zep condition L
Rmd
0 [p(m) mw] q(m)dG(m) = Fw, and from the budget constraint
NE
Rmd
0 p(m)q(m)dG(m) = E, we get EL/(wN
E) = L
Rmd
0 mq(m)dG(m) + F which, together with lmc,
yields E = (S/L)w = hw. The per capita expenditure thus depends only on effective labor supply per
capita and the wage in equilibrium, whereas profits per capita, /L, are zero.
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and the shape parameter, respectively. This distribution is useful for deriving analytical
results and taking the model to data. In particular, we obtain the following closed-form
solutions for the equilibrium cutoff and the mass of entrants:
md =

max
L
 1
k+1
and NE =
2
1 + 2
S
F
, (16)
where max  F (mmax)k /2 and 1 and 2 are positive constants that solely depend
on k. The term max can be interpreted as an inverse measure of technological possibilities:
the lower is the fixed labor requirement for entry, F , or the lower is the upper bound,
mmax, the lower is max and, hence, the better are the city’s technological possibilities.
How do population size and technological possibilities affect entry and selection?
Recall from (12) that S is increasing in L. The second expression in (16) then shows
that there are more entrants NE in a larger city. The first expression in (16), in turn,
shows that a larger L or a smaller max entails a smaller cutoff md and, thus, a lower
survival probability G(md) of entrants. This tougher selection maps into higher average
productivity, M  1/m = [1/G(md)] R md0 (1/m)dG(m) = [k/(k   1)](1/md) under a
Pareto distribution. The mass of surviving firms Np = NEG(md), which is equivalent to
consumption diversity N c in the single city case, is then equal to
N =

1 + 2
h
md
=
h
1 + 2

L
max
 1
k+1
. (17)
Since firms are heterogeneous and have different markups and market shares, the simple
(unweighted) average of markups is not an adequate measure of consumers’ exposure
to market power. Using (9) and (10), we hence define the (expenditure share) weighted
average of firm-level markups as follows:
  1
G(md)
Z md
0
p(m)q(m)
E
(m)dG(m) =
3

md
h
, (18)
where 3 is a positive constant that solely depends on k.10 Note that the average markup
is proportional to the cutoff. It thus follows from (17) and (18) that our model displays
pro-competitive effects, since  = [3/(1 + 2)] (1/N) decreases with the mass of com-
peting firms. Finally, the indirect utility in the single city case can be expressed as
U = 

1
(k+ 1)(1 + 2)
  1

h
md
=

1
(k+ 1)(1 + 2)
  1

3

, (19)
10Recent empirical work by Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) uses a similar (expenditure share) weighted
average of markups in a translog framework.
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where the term in square brackets is, by construction, positive for all k  1. Alternatively,
the indirect utility can be written as U = [1/(k + 1)   (1 + 2)]N . Hence, as can be
seen from expressions (16)–(19), a city with better technological possibilities allows for
higher utility because of tougher selection, tougher competition, and greater consumption
diversity.
The impact of city size on consumption diversity, the average markup, and the indirect
utility can be established as follows. Using (12) and (16), we can rewrite the indirect utility
as
U = 

1
(k+ 1)(1 + 2)
  1

2h
2L
h
1 

1+ 
p
L/

e 
p
L/
i L
max
 1
k+1
. (20)
The term in braces in (20) equals the effective labor supply per capita, h, which decreases
with L. The last term in expression (20) captures the cutoff productivity level, 1/md,
which increases with L. The net effect of an increase in L on the indirect utility U is thus
ambiguous, highlighting the trade-off between a dispersion force (urban frictions) and an
agglomeration force (tougher firm selection) inherent in our model. Yet, it can be shown
that U is single-peaked with respect to L as in Henderson (1974). Since the indirect utility
is proportional to N , it immediately follows that consumption diversity also exhibits a
\-shaped pattern, while the average markup  is [-shaped with respect to population
size L.
Observe that for now in our model, larger cities are more productive because of
tougher selection, but not because of technological externalities associated with agglom-
eration. In line with an abundant empirical literature (e.g., Rosenthal and Strange, 2004),
we extend our framework to allow for such agglomeration economies in Section 5.4.
3.2 Urban system: Multiple cities
We now turn to the urban system with multiple cities. The timing of events is as follows.
First, workers/consumers choose their locations. Second, given the population distribu-
tion across cities, firm entry, selection and production take place.11 We start the analysis
by deriving the market equilibrium conditions for given city sizes, and then define the
spatial equilibrium where individuals endogenously choose their locations.
11This timing simplifies our model because we need not specify which types of firms relocate as workers
move across cities. The spatial sorting of firms or workers is not the topic of the present paper.
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3.2.1 Market equilibrium
There are three sets of market equilibrium conditions in the urban system. For each
city, lmc and zep can be written analogously as in the single city setup. In addition, trade
must be balanced for each city, which is equivalent to saying that each consumer’s budget
constraint is satisfied with equality in our static economy.
As in the single city case, we assume Pareto distributions for productivity draws. The
shape parameter k  1 is assumed to be identical, but the upper bounds are allowed to
vary across cities, i.e., Gr(m) = (m/mmaxr )
k. Under this assumption, the market equilib-
rium conditions – lmc, zep, and the trade balance – can be written as follows:
NEr
"
1
 (mmaxr )
k å
s
Lsrs

ss
rs
ws
wr
mds
k+1
+ F
#
= Sr. (21)
maxr =å
s
Lsrs

ss
rs
ws
wr
mds
k+1
, (22)
NEr wr
(mmaxr )
k å
s 6=r
Lsrs

ss
rs
ws
wr
mds
k+1
= Lr å
s 6=r
sr
NEs ws
(mmaxs )
k

rr
sr
wr
ws
mdr
k+1
. (23)
where maxr  [F (mmaxr )k]/2 denotes technological possibilities. Note that maxr is city-
specific, and captures the local production amenities that are not transferable across space.
The value of maxr will be pinned down when quantifying the model. The assumption that
maxr is exogenous will be relaxed in Section 5.4, where we discuss the robustness of our
results (see also Appendix I.1).
The 3K conditions (21)–(23) depend on 3K unknowns: the wages wr, the masses
of entrants NEr , and the internal cutoffs mdr . The external cutoffs mxrs can be obtained
from (7). Combining (21) and (22), we can immediately show that
NEr =
2
1 + 2
Sr
F
, (24)
which implies that more firms choose to enter in larger cities in equilibrium. Adding the
term in r that is missing on both sides of (23), and using (22) and (24), we obtain the
following equilibrium relationship:
hr
(mdr)
k+1 =å
s
Ssrr

rr
sr
wr
ws
k 1
maxs
. (25)
The 2K conditions (22) and (25) summarize how wages, cutoffs, technological possi-
bilites, trade costs, population sizes, and effective labor supplies are related in the market
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equilibrium. Using those expressions, it can be shown that the mass of varieties con-
sumed in city r is inversely proportional to the internal cutoff, and proportional to the
effective labor supply per capita in that city:
N cr =

(1 + 2)rr
hr
mdr
. (26)
Furthermore, the (expenditure share) weighted average of markups that consumers face
in city r can be expressed as follows:
r 
åsNEs
Z mxsr
0
psr(m)qsr(m)
Er
sr(m)dGs(m)
åsNEs Gs(mxsr)
=
3rr

mdr
hr
. (27)
It follows from (26) and (27) that there are pro-competitive effects, since r decreases with
the mass N cr of competing firms in city r as r = [3/(1 + 2)](1/N cr ). Last, the indirect
utility is given by
Ur =

rr

1
(k+ 1)(1 + 2)
  1

hr
mdr
=

1
(k+ 1)(1 + 2)
  1

3
r
. (28)
As can be seen from (28), the effective labor supply per capita, hr = Sr/Lr, and the inter-
nal cutoff, mdr , jointly affect indirect utility, with an increase in the effective labor supply
and/or tougher selection leading to higher utility. Furthermore, in our specification, the
change in the average markup in city r is a sufficient statistic for the change in indirect
utility, with a lower r translating into higher utility. Alternatively, the indirect utility
can be rewritten as Ur = [1/(k + 1)  (1 + 2)]N cr , i.e., it is proportional to the mass of
varieties consumed in city r.
3.2.2 Spatial equilibrium
We now move to the spatial equilibrium where individuals endogenously choose their
locations. We introduce city-specific amenities and taste heterogeneity in residential lo-
cation into our model. This is done for two reasons. First, individuals in reality choose
their location not only based on wages, prices, and consumption diversity that result
from market interactions, but also based on non-market features such as amenities (e.g.,
climate or landscape). Second, individuals do not necessarily react in the same way to
regional gaps in wages and cost-of-living (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002; Murata, 2003). Such
taste heterogeneity offsets the extreme outcome that often arises in typical neg models,
namely that all mobile economic activity concentrates in a single city. Notice that when
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we take our model to the data, taste heterogeneity is required for the city-size distribution
not to be degenerated.12
We assume that the location choice of an individual ` is based on linear random utility
V `r = Ur +Ar + 
`
r, where Ur is given by (28) and Ar subsumes city-specific amenities that
are equally valued by all individuals. For the empirical implementation, we assume that
Ar  A(Aor,Aur ), where Aor refers to observed amenities such as coastal location and Aur to
the unobserved part. The random variable `r then captures idiosyncratic taste differences
in residential location. Following McFadden (1974), we assume that the `r are i.i.d. across
individuals and cities according to a double exponential distribution with zero mean
and variance equal to 22/6, where  is a positive constant. Since  has a positive
relationship with variance, the larger the value of , the more heterogeneous are the
consumers’ attachments to each city. Given the population distribution, an individual’s
probability of choosing city r can then be expressed as a logit form:
Pr = Pr

V `r > max
s 6=r
V `s

=
exp((Ur +Ar)/)
åKs=1 exp((Us +As)/)
. (29)
If  ! 0, which corresponds to the case without taste heterogeneity, people choose their
location based only on Ur + Ar, i.e., they choose a city with the highest Ur + Ar with
probability one. By contrast, if  ! ¥, individuals choose their location with equal
probability 1/K. In that case, taste for residential location is extremely heterogeneous, so
that Ur +Ar does not affect location decisions at all. For the city-size distribution not to
be degenerated, we assume that  > 0 in the subsequent analysis.
A spatial equilibrium is defined as a city-size distribution satisfying
Pr =
Lr
åKs=1 Ls
, 8r. (30)
In words, a spatial equilibrium is a fixed point where the choice probability of each city
is equal to that city’s share of the economy’s total population. In theory, there can be
multiple city-size distributions satisfying (30). However, our approach does not require a
condition for existence and uniqueness of spatial equilibrium, because the observed data
on the population distribution tells us which spatial equilibrium fLrgKr=1 actually realizes
in the real world.13 Indeed, in Section 4, where we take our model to data, we plug the
12An alternative approach has been taken by Allen and Arkolakis (2014), who assume Inada conditions
for housing consumption to prevent locations from emptying out completely.
13Thus, our approach allowing for multiplicity of spatial equilibria under imperfect competition is in
sharp contrast to that by Allen and Arkolakis (2014), who establish existence and uniqueness of spatial
equilibrium in a model with perfect competition. It is worth emphasizing that we do not need such prop-
erties even for the counterfactual experiments, as we discuss later.
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observed us city sizes into the right-hand side of (30) and uniquely back out (Ur +Ar)/
such that this population distribution is a spatial equilibrium.
3.3 The impact of spatial frictions: An example with two cities
In the counterfactual analysis in Section 5, we simulate how city sizes, their distribution,
productivity, and markups would look like when either urban or trade frictions change.
To build intuition for these counterfactual experiments, we now consider an example with
two cities, as is standard in the literature. The formal analysis is in Appendix C, whereas
the main text focuses on the intuition of how spatial frictions affect the fundamental
trade-off between agglomeration and dispersion forces.
In this subsection, we assume that trade costs are symmetric (12 = 21 =  and
11 = 22 = t), and that intra-city trade is less costly than inter-city trade (t   ).14 The
market equilibrium for any given city sizes L1 and L2 is then uniquely determined, and
yields the relative wage !  w1/w2 and the two internal cutoffs md1 and md2.
Now suppose that city 1 is larger than city 2 (L1 > L2) while the two cities are iden-
tical with respect to their gross labor supplies per capita (h1 = h2 = h), commuting
technologies (1 = 2 = ), and technological possibilities (max1 = 
max
2 = 
max). Then,
the market equilibrium is such that the larger city has the higher wage (! > 1) and the lower
cutoff (md1 < m
d
2). The intuition is that – due to trade frictions – firms in the larger city
have an advantage in terms of local market size, and this advantage must be offset by
higher production costs and tougher selection in equilibrium.
Turning to choice probabilities, for any given city sizes L1 and L2, (29) can be written as
P1 =
exp(/)
exp(/) + 1
and P2 =
1
exp(/) + 1
,
where   (U1   U2) + (A1   A2). Hence, P1 is increasing and P2 is decreasing in  .
Plugging (28) into the definition of  , we readily obtain
 =

t
  1
(k+ 1)(1 + 2)
  1
 
h1
md1
  h2
md2
!
, (31)
where we set A1 = A2 for simplicity. Recalling that L1 > L2, the lower cutoff in city 1
(md1 < m
d
2) constitutes an agglomeration force as it raises the indirect utility difference  .
Yet, due to urban frictions, the larger city also has lower effective labor supply per capita
(h1 < h2), which negatively affects  , thus representing a dispersion force.
14Imposing the assumption t   is not very restrictive. Indeed, the inequality rr < mins rs = mins sr
holds in 352/356  99% of the cases in our subsequent application using us data.
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For the population distribution L1 > L2 to be a spatial equilibrium, condition (30)
requires that P1 > P2, which in turn implies  > 0 and h1/md1 > h2/m
d
2 by (31). The
larger city then has greater consumption diversity (N c1 > N
c
2 ) according to (26) and a
lower average markup (1 < 2) according to (27) than the smaller city. Taking such a
spatial equilibrium as the starting point, we now consider what happens if either urban
frictions or trade frictions are eliminated.
No urban frictions. Our first counterfactual experiment will be to eliminate urban fric-
tions while leaving trade frictions unchanged. This is equivalent to setting  = 0, holding
 and t constant. In what follows, we consider how  is affected by such a change. This
allows us to study if eliminating urban frictions involves more agglomeration (larger P1)
or more dispersion (smaller P1). Let e be the value of  in the counterfactual scenario,
keeping city sizes fixed at their initial levels. Other counterfactual values are also denoted
with a tilde. Observing that eh1 = eh2 = h when  = 0, we have
sign
ne   o = sign(h  h1emd1   h  h2emd2 + h1
 
1emd1   1md1
!
  h2
 
1emd2   1md2
!)
. (32)
The first two terms in (32) stand for the direct effects of eliminating urban frictions. In the
initial situation where  > 0, we know that h1 < h2 < h as urban frictions are greater in the
larger city. We also know that md1 < m
d
2 holds even without urban frictions as L1 > L2, so
that emd1 < emd2. Hence, the first positive term always dominates the second negative term,
thus showing that the direct effects favor the large city by increasing the probability P1 of
choosing city 1. However, eliminating urban frictions also induces indirect effects through
the cutoffs, which are captured by the second two terms in (32). Both of these terms are
negative and thus work in the opposite direction than the direct effects. Specifically, it can
be shown that setting  = 0 implies md1 < emd1 < emd2 < md2. That is, average productivity
goes down in the larger city when the population distribution is held fixed, while it goes
up in the smaller city.15
If the direct effects dominate the indirect effects, we have e >  so that P1 increases
and the large city becomes even larger as urban frictions are eliminated. The increase
in population then leads to a productivity gain, which may offset the productivity drop
at a given population size. As we show below, such a pattern indeed emerges in the
15The reason is the following: the reduction of  from any given positive value to zero raises aggregate
labor supply Sr in both cities. The increase is relatively stronger in the larger city (S1/S2 goes up), so that
the relative wage ! increases. To offset this, the equilibrium cutoff must thus increase in the larger city and
decrease in the smaller city.
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quantified multi-city model (see Figures 1, 2, and 4): big cities like New York become
even larger. Holding the initial population fixed, productivity goes down in New York,
while it goes up once we take population changes into account, as shown in Figure 4. By
the same argument, small cities may end up with a lower productivity due to their loss
in population. Hence, eliminating urban frictions makes the productivity change in the
economy as a whole ambiguous.
No trade frictions. Our second counterfactual experiment will be to eliminate trade
frictions while leaving urban frictions unchanged. More specifically, we consider a sce-
nario where consumers face the same trade costs for local and non-local varieties. This is
equivalent to setting  = t, holding  constant. As before, let e be the value of  in the
counterfactual scenario, while keeping city sizes fixed at the initial level. Noting that h1
and h2 remain constant, the change in  can now be written as
sign
ne   o = sign(h1
 
1emd1   1md1
!
  h2
 
1emd2   1md2
!)
. (33)
It can be shown that now both cutoffs decrease for given population sizes, i.e., emd1 < md1
and emd2 < md2. Both cities, therefore, experience a productivity gain. The first term in
brackets in (33) is thus positive and the second term is negative. Yet it can be shown thate <  holds if max2 /max1  (h2/h1)k+1. In other words, the large city becomes smaller
if the two cities are not too different in terms of their technological possibilities. In the
simple case where max2 /
max
1 = 1, the large city always becomes smaller as h2/h1 >
1. In contrast, the small city becomes larger and, consequently, experiences a stronger
productivity gain than the large city. We show below that such a pattern also emerges in
our quantified multi-city model (see Figures 5 and 6).16
4 Quantification
We now take our multi-city model to the data by estimating or calibrating its parameters.
This procedure can be divided into two broad stages, namely the quantification of the
16Other two-region neg models with commuting costs (Tabuchi, 1998; Murata and Thisse, 2005) would
come to qualitatively similar conclusions about how falling transport or commuting costs affect the spatial
equilibrium. Helpman (1998) considers a fixed supply of land instead of commuting, but his model would
also display a similar pattern as falling transport costs are dispersive, while greater abundance of land is
agglomerative. Though useful for illustrative purposes, such two-region examples do not convey a sense
of magnitude about the quantitative importance of spatial frictions in practice, however. Section 4 of this
paper deals precisely with this issue.
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market equilibrium and that of the spatial equilibrium, which we now explain in turn. Details
about this procedure and the data are relegated to Appendix F.
4.1 Market equilibrium
The quantification of the market equilibrium consists of the following five steps:
1. Using the definition of total effective labor supply and data on commuting time,
hours worked, and city size at the msa level, we uniquely obtain the city-specific
commuting technology parameters br that constitute urban frictions.
2. Using the specification rs  drs, where drs is the distance from r to s, we estimate
a gravity equation that relates the value of bilateral trade flows to distance. For a
given value of the Pareto shape parameter k, we obtain the distance elasticity b that
constitutes trade frictions.
3. The estimated distance elasticity, together with the value of k and data on labor
supply, value added per worker, and city size, allows us to uniquely back out the
set of city-specific technological possibilities bmaxr and (relative) wages bwr that are
consistent with the market equilibrium conditions.17
4. Using the set of city-specific technological possibilities thus obtained, we draw a
large sample of firms from within the model to compute the difference between the
simulated and observed establishment size distributions.
5. Iterating through steps 2 to 4, we search over the parameter space to find the value
of the Pareto shape parameter k that minimizes the sum of squared differences
between the simulated and observed establishment size distributions.
As for the quantification results, our iterative procedure yields the Pareto shape pa-
rameter bk = 6.4. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 in Appendix F.2 show that, despite having
only a single degree of freedom, the simulated establishment size distribution fits the
observed establishment size distribution well.
Turning to spatial frictions, we compute the commuting technology parameter that
constitutes urban frictions for each msa. As shown in Table 5 in Appendix J, the value
of br ranges from 0.0708 (Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana and New York-Northern
New Jersey-Long Island) and 0.0867 (Chicago-Naperville-Joliet) to 0.9995 (Yuba City, CA)
17Even with urban costs, we can establish uniqueness in a similar way than in Behrens et al. (2014b). The
proof is available upon request.
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and 1.4824 (Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA). Thus, big cities tend to have better commuting
technologies per unit of distance.18 For trade frictions, our estimation yields ck = 1.2918
(with standard error 0.0271) which, given bk = 6.4, implies b = 0.2018.19
We then obtain the values of the technological possibilities bmaxr , which may be viewed
as a measure for msa-level production amenities. Table 5 in Appendix J reports those
values, along with the observed msa populations scaled by their mean (i.e., Lr/L) and
average productivities (Mr). From the quantification procedure we also obtain the wagesbwr that are consistent with the market equilibrium conditions, which we compare to
the observed wages at the msa level in Section 4.3. Ultimately, the quantification of the
market equilibrium allows us to measure the indirect utility bUr from (28) by using data
on hr = Sr/Lr and mdr , as well as the estimate of brr.
4.2 Spatial equilibrium
Using the spatial equilibrium conditions (30), the expression of the indirect utility bUr, and
data on observed amenities Aor, we obtain a measure for unobserved amenities Aur and
the relative weight of the indirect utility and amenities for individual location decisions
that are consistent with the observed city-size distribution.
Setting (U1 + A1)/  0 as a normalization, and using the observed Lr for the 356
msas, the spatial equilibrium conditions Pr = Lr/L for r = 2, 3, : : : ,K can be uniquely
solved for (Ur + Ar)/.20 We thus obtain the values of (Ur + Ar)/ that replicate the
observed city-size distribution as a spatial equilibrium. Let bDr denote this solution satis-
18For any given distance x from the cbd, a smaller  implies that people spend less time to commute to
the cbd. However, this does not necessarily mean that average commuting time is shorter in larger cities
because of longer average commuting distances. Our finding that big cities tend to have better commuting
technologies also holds when assuming a linear commuting technology as in Murata and Thisse (2005).
19We use ols estimation with fixed effects as our benchmark. As a robustness check, we also consider
the ppml fixed effects estimator by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), which yields ck = 1.4659 and bk = 8.5
when redoing the iterative procedure. When it comes to the counterfactual analysis, however, it turns
out that the ppml approach leads to virtually the same predictions as our benchmark. By contrast our
estimate is larger than the value of ck = 0.82 reported by Duranton et al. (2014) which is obtained from
a small sample of large cfs regions. Our subsequent results do not change qualitatively and change little
quantitatively when using their estimate of the distance elasticity.
20See Appendix G.1 for the proof of uniqueness of (Ur +Ar)/, given the observed population distribu-
tion, which is, in turn, uniquely pinned down by the data. Note that the uniqueness of (Ur +Ar)/ does
not imply the uniqueness of spatial equilibrium in our model.
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fying
Pr =
exp(bDr)
åKs=1 exp(bDs) = LrL , bD1 = 0. (34)
Recall that the amenity term is given by Ar = Ar(Aor,Aur ). In the quantitative analysis
we impose a linear functional form Ar = 0 + 2Aor + 3Aur , which implies
Ur +Ar

=
0

+
1

Ur +
2

Aor +
3

Aur
= 0 + 1Ur + 2A
o
r + "r.
Having solved (34) for bDr, we then gauge the relative importance of the indirect utilitybUr and observed amenities Aor in consumers’ location choices by estimating a simple OLS
regression as follows, bDr = 0 + 1bUr + 2Aor + "r, (35)
which yields bDr =  0.2194
(0.2644)
+ 1.7481
(0.5289)
bUr + 0.0652
(0.0199)
Aor +b"r. (36)
Consistent with theory, both indirect utility and observed amenities significantly influence
the spatial distribution of population across msas, both coefficients being positive.21 The
fitted residuals b"r can be interpreted as a measure of the unobserved part of the msa
amenities. We hence let \(3/)Aur  b"r which by construction is uncorrelated with Aor.
Notice that, to identify 1, we impose in our benchmark that "r is orthogonal to bUr. As
a robustness check we relax this assumption and allow the cities’ unobserved amenities
to be correlated with the indirect utility. As will be discussed in Section 5.4, our results
do not change much when considering other values of 1.
Table 5 in Appendix J reports the observed and unobserved consumption amenities, as
well as the production amenities. Several points are worth emphasizing. First, in contrast
to Roback (1982) type approaches, spatial patterns of msa-level consumption and produc-
tion amenities (b"r and bmaxr ) are derived from a quantified spatial equilibrium framework
21Notice that in our model population shares are related to local indirect utility and amenities as follows
Lr
L
=
exp((0 + 1Ur + 2Aor + "r))
åKs=1 exp((0 + 1Us + 2Aos + "s))
.
Taking logs on both sides of this equation and differentiating yield @ lnLr/@Ur = 1, if we neglect the
impact of changes in Ur on the denominator, which is a reasonable approximation as long as there are
many regions. In other words, the coefficient 1 can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of local population
with respect to local utility.
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where trade frictions are explicitly taken into account. Second, both observed and un-
observed consumption amenities are positively correlated with city size, the correlation
being stronger for the latter (0.7023) than for the former (0.1334). Third, while the corre-
lation between Aor and b"r is zero by construction, there is also little correlation between
technological possibilities and each type of consumption amenities (-0.0867 and 0.0713
for Aor and b"r, respectively). This is consistent with the results by Chen and Rosenthal
(2008) who find that good business locations in the us need not have good consumption
amenities.
4.3 msa- and firm-level model fit
Before turning to the counterfactual experiments, it is important to point out that our
model can replicate several empirical facts, both at the msa and firm levels, that have
not been used in the quantification procedure. We briefly summarize some of those
dimensions and again relegate several details of this model fit analysis to Appendix F.3.
First, since our key objective is to investigate the importance of urban and trade fric-
tions, having an idea of how well our model captures empirical facts about these dimen-
sions is particularly important.
Urban frictions. We first consider urban frictions by comparing the ‘model-based’ and
observed aggregate land rents. The former can be obtained by making use of (13).22
The latter is, in turn, obtained by ALRr = GMRr/(1  ownersharer), where GMR is the
(aggregate) gross monthly rent.23 The simple correlation between the model-based and
observed aggregate land rents across msas is 0.9805, while the Spearman rank correlation
is 0.9379. Dividing the ALRr by the number of housing units in the respective msa,
in order to control for differences in the density of developed land across cities and to
eliminate spurious scale effects, the simple and Spearman rank correlation coefficients
22To obtain the ‘model-based’ aggregate land rent, we set Rr(xr) = 0 in (13) for all cities since data on
Rr(xr) is not readily available. It is a priori unclear whether allowing for heterogeneity in Rr(xr) raises
the correlations between observed and model-based land rents that we report here. Note that we need not
make any assumption on the value of Rr(xr) when quantifying the model and running counterfactuals.
23The formula can be obtained as follows. First, the total amount of expenditure in housing ser-
vices (ALR) is given by the sum of the gross monthly rent (GMR) and the equivalent rent value
for houses that are owned (ERV). Data on GMR, which can be decomposed as (average rent) 
(number of houses that are rented), is available. Now assume that GMR/(number of houses rented) =
ERV/(number of houses owned) holds in each city at equilibrium by arbitrage. We then obtain ALR =
GMR/(1  share of houses that are owned).
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decrease a bit to 0.6677 and 0.6030, respectively. Still, those findings are reassuring that
our model is able to capture urban frictions across msas.24
Trade frictions. We next turn to trade frictions. Note that our estimate of the trade
elasticity ck for the year 2007 closely matches the value of 1.348 reported by Hillberry
and Hummels (2008) from estimation of a gravity equation at the 3-digit zip code level
using the confidential cfs microdata. We can further assess to what extent our model
can cope with existing micro evidence on the spatial structure of shipping patterns. As
shown in Appendix F.3, both aggregate shipment values and the number of shipments
predicted by our model fall off very quickly with distance – becoming very small beyond a
threshold of about 200miles – whereas price per unit first rises with distance and average
shipment values do not display a clear pattern. These results are in line with those in
Hillberry and Hummels (2008). Furthermore, we can also compare shipping shares and
shipping distances by establishment size class predicted by our model, and the observed
counterparts as reported by Holmes and Stevens (2012). Our model can qualitatively
reproduce their observed shipment shares. It can also explain their finding that the mean
distance shipped increases with establishment size.
Second, the correlation between actual relative wages and those predicted by our
model is 0.7379 and thus reasonably high. Third, the representative firm sample drawn
from our quantified model can replicate the observed distribution of establishments
across msas. Table 1 in Appendix F.2 compares our simulated data with observed coun-
terparts. As can be seen, the simple cross-msa correlation for the total number of es-
tablishments is 0.7253, with a slightly larger rank correlation of 0.733. Furthermore, our
model performs better when focusing on medium-sized and large establishments across
msas, where correlations range between 0.889 and 0.9412.
24One might argue that our simple monocentric city model is not the most appropriate specification as
large msas are usually polycentric. To see how urban frictions relate to polycentricity, we conduct another
model fit exercise and compute a simple correlation between br and the number of employment centers in
each msa for the year 2000 as identified by Arribas-Bel and Sanz Gracia (2014). The correlation is  0.4282,
while the Spearman rank correlation is  0.5643. Our monocentric model with city-specific commuting tech-
nology thus seems to capture the tendency that larger cities are more efficient for commuting as they allow
for more employment centers, thereby reducing the average commuting distance through employment de-
centralization. Combes et al. (2012a) find similar results for land prices in France, where decentralization
within cities results in a less than proportional relationship between land prices at the city center and city
population.
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5 Counterfactuals
The aim of this section is to assess the importance of spatial frictions for the us city-
size distribution, for individual city sizes, as well as for the distributions of productivity
and markups across msas.25 To this end we eliminate urban frictions or trade frictions
(counterfactuals cf1 and cf2, respectively) in the model quantified in the previous section.
We first discuss our benchmark results, and then conduct two robustness checks: one
about the existence of agglomeration economies, and one about the relative weight of
indirect utility and amenities in individuals’ location choices.26
5.1 No urban frictions
In the first counterfactual experiment (which we call ‘no urban frictions’), we set all
commuting-related frictions – and hence all land rents – to zero (br = 0 for all r) while
keeping trade frictions brs, technological possibilities bmaxr , consumption amenities (Aor
and b"r), and the location choice parameters b0, b1, and b2 constant.27 This corresponds to
a hypothetical world where only goods are costly to transport while living in cities does
not impose any urban costs. Comparing the counterfactual equilibrium for this scenario
to the initial spatial equilibrium is then a meaningful exercise, as it addresses to what
extent the actual us economic geography is shaped by urban frictions.28
City sizes. Starting with city sizes, eliminating urban frictions leads to (gross) cross-msa
population movements of about 4 million people, i.e., 1.6% of the total msa population in
our sample. Figure 1 plots percentage changes in msa population against the initial log
msa population. As can be seen, large cities would on average gain population, whereas
small and medium-sized cities tend to lose. In other words, urban frictions limit the size
of large cities. The size of New York, for example, would increase by about 8.5%. That is
to say, urban frictions matter for the size of New York, as the city is 8.5% smaller than it
25In our specification, the change in the average markup in city r is a sufficient statistic for the change in
indirect utility in that city as shown by (28).
26Detailed results for all the different counterfactuals that we run, including the various robustness
checks, are provided in Table 4 in Appendix I.
27To put this counterfactual into context, the average commuting time of us workers in 2007 was 25.3
minutes per journey adding up to 25.3 2 5 = 253 minutes per week, i.e., 4.22 hours. This compares to
38.7 average hours worked in a week by a us worker and so eliminating urban frictions is equivalent to
increasing actual working time, and so output, by up to 10.9% for given productivity.
28Although workers are mobile in our model, we can set urban frictions to zero without having degener-
ate equilibria with full agglomeration. The reason is that, as explained before, consumers’ location choice
probabilities are expressed as a logit so that no city disappears.
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Figure 1: Changes in msa populations and initial size (cf1)
would be in a hypothetical world without urban frictions. Some msas close to New York
and Boston are affected even more by urban frictions. For example, New Haven-Milford,
CT, is 12.1% smaller and Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT, is even 15.9% smaller than it
would be. The top panel of Figure 2 further indicates that the impacts of urban frictions
follow a rich spatial pattern and are highly unevenly spread across msas.
Interestingly, although the sizes of individual cities would be substantially different
in a world without urban frictions, the city-size distribution would be almost the same.
This is shown in Figure 3. A standard rank-size rule regression reveals that the coefficient
on log size rises slightly from  0.9249 to  0.9178, the change being statistically insignif-
icant.29 The hypothetical elimination of urban frictions would thus move single cities up
or down in the urban hierarchy, but within a stable city-size distribution. We will discuss
this stability in greater depth below in Section 5.3.
Productivity. Turning to average productivity, the middle panel of Figure 2 shows that
the impact of urban frictions differs substantially across cities. New York’s productivity
is 0.76% higher in the counterfactual equilibrium. Urban frictions thus have a negative
impact on productivity as they limit the size of New York. However, most msas would
have a lower productivity level if urban frictions were eliminated, for example small cities
29We follow Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) and adjust the rank by subtracting 1/2. The standard deviation
of the coefficient on the log of city size is 0.0086 for the initially observed city-size distribution.
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Figure 2: Spatial pattern of counterfactual changes in Lr, 1/mdr and r (cf1)
like Monroe, MI, by 0.9%. This means that the presence of urban frictions in the real
world leads to a higher productivity as population is retained in those cities. Computing
the nation-wide productivity change, weighted by msa population shares in the initial
equilibrium, we find that eliminating urban frictions would increase average productivity
by a mere 0.04%.
It is important to see that these results refer to the long-run impacts of eliminating
urban frictions on productivity, as they include the effects of population movements. To
gauge the contribution of labor mobility to these overall impacts, we disentangle the short-
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Figure 3: Rank-size rule, observed and counterfactual (cf1)
run effects, before the population reshufflings have taken place, from the long-run effects.
The left panel of Figure 4 illustrates the cutoff changes across msas when eliminating
urban frictions, holding city sizes fixed at their initial levels. It shows that the cutoffs mdr
rise, on average, in larger cities. However, as can be seen from the right panel of Figure 4,
the subsequent movements of population (which flows toward the larger cities), more
than offset this initial change, thereby generating larger productivity gains in the bigger
cities in the long-run equilibrium.30 This decomposition of the short- and long-run effects
can also be related to the comparative static results of Section 3.3. There, we have shown
that the instantaneous impact of reducing urban frictions – keeping Lr fixed – is to raise
the cutoff in the large city and to lower it in the small city. This pattern can get reversed,
however, once the population movements are taken into account.
Markups. Turning to the long-run impact on markups, the bottom panel of Figure 2
reveals that this is the dimension where the largest changes take place. Markups would
decrease everywhere, with reductions ranging from 5.3% to about 16%, but the more so
for the most populated areas of the East and West coasts. As can be seen from (27), the
reason for these large changes is twofold. First, eliminating urban frictions increases the
effective labor supply per capita hr everywhere, which allows for more firms in each msa
30Some simple ols regressions of the change in mdr in the short- and in the long-run on inital population
yield: mdr/mdr =  0.0821 + 0.0127Lr in the short-run, and mdr/mdr = 0.0817   0.0194Lr in
the long-run, thus showing the switch in the results depending on whether or not population is mobile.
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Figure 4: Difference in short- and long-run relationships between mdr/mdr and Lr (cf1)
and, therefore, for more competition. Second, there is an effect going through the cutoffs.
Some places see their cutoffs fall, especially larger cities which receive population inflows,
and this puts additional pressure on markups there. In contrast, cutoffs increase in cities
that lose population. However, even in those cities it turns out that markups decrease, as
the pro-competitive effect due to higher effective labor supply per capita dominates the
anti-competitive effect of the higher cutoff.
To summarize, even without urban frictions, the city-size distribution would remain
fairly stable, despite the fact that larger cities tend to grow and smaller cities tend to
shrink. Furthermore, the ‘no urban frictions’ case supports more firms, which reduces
markups and expands product diversity, though firms are not on average much more
productive than in a world with urban frictions. The productivity gap between large and
small cities would, however, widen.
5.2 No trade frictions
How do trade frictions shape the us economic geography? To address this question, we
set external trade costs from s to r equal to internal trade costs in r (sr = rr for all r
and s) in the second counterfactual experiment (which we call ‘no trade frictions’). This
experiment corresponds to a hypothetical world where consumers face the same trade
costs for local and non-local varieties.31
31Eaton and Kortum (2002) consider a similar counterfactual scenario in the context of international trade
with a fixed population distribution. We have also experimented with setting rs = rr for all r and s, which
corresponds to a hypothetical world where goods are as costly to trade between msas as within msas from
the firms’ perspective. The results are largely the same.
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Figure 5: Changes in msa populations and initial size (cf2)
City sizes. Starting with city sizes, eliminating trade frictions would lead to significant
(gross) cross-msa population movements of about 10.2 million people, i.e., 4.08% of the
total msa population in our sample. Some small and remote cities would gain substan-
tially. For example, the population of Casper, WY, would grow by about 105% and that
of Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA, by about 99.4%, thus implying a notable increase of com-
muting costs and land rents in those cities. That is, trade frictions limit the size of small
and remote cities substantially. Figure 5 plots the percentage changes in msa population
against the initial log msa population. Consistent with the comparative static results of
Section 3.3, in a world without trade frictions larger cities lose ground and individuals
move, on average, to smaller cities to relax urban costs. These changes are depicted in the
top panel of Figure 6. Although individual cities would be substantially affected by the
fall in trade frictions, the city-size distribution remains again quite stable, as can be seen
from Figure 7. The coefficient on log size drops from  0.9249 to  0.9392, yet this change
is again statistically insignificant.
Productivity. Concerning the changes in average productivity, observe first that all msas
gain. In other words, the existence of trade frictions in the real world causes productivity
losses for the us economy. Yet, as can be seen from the middle panel of Figure 6, these
impacts are unevenly spread across msas. If trade frictions were eliminated, some small
cities would gain substantially (e.g., an increase of about 125.5% in Great Falls, MT), while
large cities would gain significantly less: 41.18% in New York, 48.08% in Los Angeles,
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Figure 6: Spatial pattern of counterfactual changes in Lr, 1/mdr and r (cf2)
and 55.71% in Chicago. The first reason is linked to market access. Indeed, the more
populated areas, e.g., those centered around California and New England, would be those
gaining the least from a reduction of trade frictions, as they already provide firms with a
good access to a large local market. The second reason is that, as stated above, large cities
tend to lose population, thereby reducing the productivity gains brought about by the
fall in trade frictions. Computing the nation-wide productivity change, weighted by msa
population shares in the initial equilibrium, we find that eliminating trade frictions would
increase average productivity by 67.59%. Thus, reducing spatial frictions for shipping
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Figure 7: Rank-size rule, observed and counterfactual (cf2)
goods would entail substantial aggregate productivity gains.
Markups. The bottom panel of Figure 6 reveals that markups would decrease consider-
ably in a world without trade frictions, with reductions ranging from 29% to 55%. Such
reductions are particularly strong in msas with poor market access, i.e., the center of the
us and the areas close to the borders. Observe that the changes in markups – though
substantial – are more compressed than the changes in productivity (the coefficient of
variation for productivity changes is 0.18, while that for changes in markups is 0.09). The
reason is the following. Eliminating trade frictions reduces cutoffs in all msas, but espe-
cially in small and remote ones. This puts downward pressure on markups. Yet, there
is also an indirect effect through changes in effective labor supply hr. An increase in
hr, which occurs in big cities that lose population, reduces markups more strongly than
what is implied by the direct change only, while the decrease in hr that occurs in small
and remote cities gaining population works in the opposite direction and dampens the
markup reductions.
To summarize, without trade frictions, the city-size distribution would remain fairly
stable, despite the fact that larger cities tend to shrink and smaller cities tend to grow.
Furthermore, the ‘no trade frictions’ case allows for higher average productivity and lower
markups by intensifying competition in all msas, and especially in small and remote ones.
The productivity gap between large and small cities would, hence, shrink.
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5.3 How important are spatial frictions?
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate the impact of both
urban and trade frictions on the size distribution of cities.32 A key insight of our analysis
is that spatial frictions have a quite limited impact on that distribution. The rank-size rule
would still hold with a statistically identical coefficient in a world without urban or trade
frictions.
Note that our result on the stability of the city-size distribution contrasts with that of
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), who find that the size distribution tilts substantially
when urban frictions are reduced. The difference in results can be understood as follows.
In their analysis, the commuting friction parameter is common to all msas, whereas we
allow commuting technologies to differ across cities. In our setting, big cities like New
York or Los Angeles tend to have the best commuting technologies per unit of distance
in the initial equilibrium, so that the impacts of setting br = 0 are relatively small there.
By contrast, in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), the commuting technology improves
equally across all msas so that big cities get very large due to larger efficiency gains
in commuting than in our case. Another key difference is that in Desmet and Rossi-
Hansberg (2013), all consumers react in the same way to changes in utility and amenities,
whereas those reactions are idiosyncratic in our model and, therefore, less extreme.
Although spatial frictions hardly affect the city-size distribution in our framework,
they do matter for the sizes of individual cities within that stable distribution. Indeed,
eliminating spatial frictions leads to aggregate (gross) inter-msa reallocations of about 4–
10 million people. Whether or not large or small cities gain population crucially depends
on what type of spatial frictions is eliminated. Urban frictions limit the size of large cities,
whereas trade frictions limit the size of small cities. As extensively discussed above, our
approach is able to quantify those effects.
Notice that we have so far considered simultaneous reductions in spatial frictions for all
cities. We can also look at a unilateral reduction for a single city. Specifically, let us briefly
consider two additional counterfactuals. In the first one, we only eliminate urban frictions
for New York. In that case, New York grows by about 19.73% (i.e., by about 3.7 million
people). In the second one, we set sr = rr for all s only when r is New York. That is,
32The influential models on the city-size distribution by Gabaix (1999), Eeckhout (2004), Duranton (2007)
and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) include urban costs but assume away trade costs. None of these
papers analyzes how the city-size distribution is affected by urban frictions. The most closely related paper
in that respect is Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013). Yet, their framework is not suited to investigate the
impact of trade frictions on the city-size distribution, as it also abstracts from trade costs.
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we improve the market access to New York for all firms that are located elsewhere, while
holding the market access of firms located in New York to other msas constant. In that
case, New York shrinks remarkably by 15.57% (i.e., about 3 million people). Hence, a
unilateral change in spatial frictions for a single city has a much larger impact on the size
of that city. More generally, these results show that the relative levels across cities of both
types of frictions matter a lot to understand the sizes of individual cities.
Finally, our experiments show that urban and trade frictions matter, though to a dif-
ferent extent, for the distributions of productivity and markups – and ultimately welfare
– across msas. Eliminating trade frictions would lead to significant productivity gains
and substantially reduced markups, both of which increase welfare. These changes are
highly heterogeneous across space and tend to reduce differences in productivity and
city sizes across msas. Concerning urban frictions, their elimination would not give rise
to such significant productivity gains, but would still considerably intensify competition
and generate lower markups by allowing for more firms in equilibrium.
5.4 Robustness checks
We now examine the robustness of our results to the existence of agglomeration economies,
and to alternative values of 1, which captures the relative weight of the indirect utility
and amenities.
Agglomeration economies. The recent literature shows that agglomeration economies,
i.e., productivity gains due to larger or denser urban areas, are a prevalent feature of the
spatial economy (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Melo et al., 2009). We have so far fo-
cused entirely on one channel: larger cities are more productive because of tougher firm
selection. Yet, larger or denser cities can become more productive for various other rea-
sons such as sharing–matching–learning externalities (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Behrens
et al., 2014a).
In Appendix I, we illustrate a simple way to extend our framework to include ag-
glomeration economies (reported as cf3, cf4, cf7, and cf8 in Table 4) and show that
the results change little compared to our specifications without agglomeration economies
(reported as cf1, cf2, cf5, and cf6 in Table 4). Intuitively, the reason is that – compared
to our previous specification – not many more people change location in response to the
elimination of spatial frictions. This implies, in turn, that there are only small additional
productivity gains (or losses) induced by agglomeration economies. Note that our results
are not incompatible with the ones by Combes et al. (2012b), who argue that agglomer-
ation economies are more important than selection effects. The reason is that their two
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identifying assumptions, namely a common productivity distribution for entrants in all
cities and no income effects, are not satisfied in our model. Furthermore, their results are
established for a cross-section of cities, given spatial frictions, whereas we consider changes
in spatial frictions.
Relative weight of the indirect utility and amenities. The quantification of our model
suggests that amenities and regional attachment are important for shaping the city-size
distribution. One may thus wonder how sensitive our qualitative and quantitative results
are to alternative values of 1 in (35). Recall that 1 determines the relative weight of
the indirect utility and amenities in individual location decisions, and any correlation
between bUr and unobserved amenities "r will lead to a biased estimate of this weight.
Hence, it could be the case that our relatively small population movements in response
to shocks to spatial frictions are driven by too low an estimate of 1.
In Appendix I, we show that our main results are robust, both qualitatively and to a
large extent quantitatively, to higher values of 1 (see also Behrens et al. (2013) for the
robustness to even higher values of 1). In particular, amenities do not matter for the
city-size distribution to remain stable between the initial and counterfactual equilibria
because that distribution is hardly affected even when we greatly reduce the importance
of amenities relative to the indirect utility in consumers’ location choices.33
6 Conclusions
We have developed a general equilibrium model of a spatial economy with multiple cities
and endogenous location decisions. Using 2007 us data at the state and msa levels, we
have quantified our model using all of its market and spatial equilibrium conditions, as
well as a gravity equation for trade flows and a logit model for consumers’ location choice
probabilities. The quantified model performs well and is able to replicate – both at the
msa and firm levels – a number of empirical features that are linked to urban and trade
frictions.
To assess the importance of spatial frictions, we have used our model to study two
counterfactual scenarios. Those allow us to trace out the impacts of both trade and urban
frictions on the city-size distribution, the sizes of individual cities, as well as on produc-
33However, amenities do matter for replicating the observed initial city-size distribution. Indeed, as
in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), setting all unobserved amenities across cities equal to their mean,
holding all spatial frictions fixed, we show that there would be a substantial tilt of the city-size distribution
(see Figure 10 in Appendix I).
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tivity and competition across space. A first key insight is that the city-size distribution is
hardly affected by the presence of either trade or urban frictions. A second key insight
is that, within the stable distribution, the sizes of individual cities can be affected sub-
stantially by changes in spatial frictions. Last, our third key insight is that the presence
of spatial frictions reduces welfare via too high price-cost margins and, depending on the
type of spatial frictions we consider, foregone productivity or reduced product diversity.
These results are robust to the presence of agglomeration economies and to potential bias
when estimating how individuals’ location decisions are affected by changes in spatial
frictions.
Our approach brings various strands of literature closer together. In particular, our
model: (i) considers trade and urban frictions that are identified as being relevant by
the neg and urban economics literature; (ii) endogenizes productivity, markups, and
product diversity, three aspects that loom large in the recent trade literature; (iii) allows
us to deal with heterogeneity along several dimensions (across space, across firms, across
consumers); (iv) can be readily brought to data in very a self-contained way; and (v)
replicates features of the data not used in the quantification stage. We believe that our
framework provides a useful starting point for further general equilibrium counterfactual
analysis involving various policy experiments.
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Appendix
The Appendix is structured as follows: Appendix A shows how to derive the demand
functions (2) and the firm-level variables (9) using the Lambert W function. In Ap-
pendix B we provide integrals involving the Lambert W function and derive the terms
f1,2,3,4g that are used in the paper. Appendix C contains proofs and computations
for the single city case. In Appendix Dwe derive the equilibrium conditions (21)–(23) and
provide further derivations for the multi-city case. Appendix E deals with the example
with two cities. Appendix F provides details about the quantification procedure, the data
used, and the different elements of model fit. Appendix G proves that the spatial equilib-
rium is uniquely determined in our quantification procedure, and presents the details of
the instrumental variable approach. Appendix H describes the procedure for conducting
counterfactual analysis with our quantified framework, while Appendix I examines the
robustness of our results. Finally, Appendix J reports some additional results as Table 5.
Appendix A: Demand functions and firm-level variables.
A.1. Derivation of the demand functions (2). Letting  stand for the Lagrange mul-
tiplier, the first-order condition for an interior solution to the maximization problem (1)
satisfies
e qsr(i) = psr(i), 8i 2 
sr (A-1)
and the budget constraint ås
R

sr
psr(k)qsr(k)dk = Er. Taking the ratio of (A-1) for i 2 
sr
and j 2 
vr yields
qsr(i) = qvr(j) +
1

ln

pvr(j)
psr(i)

8i 2 
sr, 8j 2 
vr.
Multiplying this expression by pvr(j), integrating with respect to j 2 
vr, and summing
across all origins v we obtain
qsr(i)å
v
Z

vr
pvr(j)dj =å
v
Z

vr
pvr(j)qvr(j)dj| {z }
 Er
+
1
åv
Z

vr
ln

pvr(j)
psr(i)

pvr(j)dj. (A-2)
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Using pr  (1/N cr )åv
R

vr
pvr(j)dj, expression (A-2) can be rewritten as follows:
qsr(i) =
Er
N cr p¯r
  1

ln psr(i) +
1
N cr p¯r
å
v
Z

vr
ln [pvr(j)] pvr(j)dj
=
Er
N cr p¯r
  1

ln

psr(i)
N cr p¯r

+
1
åv
Z

vr
ln

pvr(j)
N cr p¯r

pvr(j)
N cr p¯r
dj,
which, given the definition of r, yields (2).
A.2. Derivation of the firm-level variables (9) and properties of W . Using pds =
mxrsrswr, the first-order conditions (6) can be rewritten as
ln

mxrsrswr
prs(m)

= 1  rsmwr
prs(m)
.
Taking the exponential of both sides and rearranging terms, we have
e
m
mxrs
=
rsmwr
prs(m)
e
rsmwr
prs(m) .
Noting that the Lambert W function is defined as ' = W (')eW (') and setting ' =
em/mxrs, we obtain
W

e
m
mxrs

=
rsmwr
prs(m)
,
which implies prs(m) as given in expression (9). Then, the expression for the quan-
tities qrs(m) = (1/) [1  rsmwr/prs(m)] and the expression for the operating profits
rs(m) = Lsqrs(m) [prs(m)  rsmwr] are straightforward to compute.
Turning to the properties of the Lambert W function, ' = W (')eW (') implies that
W (')  0 for all '  0. Taking logarithms on both sides and differentiating yields
W 0(') = W (')
'[W (') + 1]
> 0
for all ' > 0. Finally, we have: 0 = W (0)eW (0), which implies W (0) = 0; and e =
W (e)eW (e), which implies W (e) = 1.
Appendix B: Integrals involving the Lambert W function.
To derive closed-form solutions for various expressions throughout the paper we need
to compute integrals involving the Lambert W function. This can be done by using the
change in variables suggested by Corless et al. (1996, p.341). Let
z  W

e
m
I

, so that e
m
I
= zez, where I = mdr ,m
x
rs.
II
The subscript r can be dropped in the single city case. The change in variables then
yields dm = (1+ z)ez 1Idz, with the new integration bounds given by 0 and 1. Under
our assumption of a Pareto distribution for productivity draws, the change in variables
allows us to rewrite integrals in simplified form.
B.1. First, consider the following expression, which appears when integrating firms’
outputs: Z I
0
m
h
1 W

e
m
I
i
dGr(m) = 1 (mmaxr )
 k Ik+1,
where 1  ke (k+1)
R 1
0 (1  z2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends
on the shape parameter k.
B.2. Second, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ operating profits:Z I
0
m

W

e
m
I
 1
+W

e
m
I

  2

dGr(m) = 2 (mmaxr )
 k Ik+1,
where 2  ke (k+1)
R 1
0 (1 + z)
 
z 1 + z   2 (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which
solely depends on the shape parameter k.
B.3. Third, the following expression appears when deriving the (expenditure share)
weighted average of markups:Z I
0
m

W

e
m
I
 2  W e m
I
 1
dGr(m) = 3 (mmaxr )
 k Ik+1,
where 3  ke (k+1)
R 1
0 (z
 2   z 1)(1+ z)(zez)kezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely
depends on the shape parameter k.
B.4. Finally, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ revenues:Z I
0
m

W

e
m
I
 1   1dGr(m) = 4 (mmaxr ) k Ik+1,
where 4  ke (k+1)
R 1
0 (z
 1  z) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends
on the shape parameter k. Using the expressions for 1 and 2, one can verify that
4 = 1 + 2.
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Appendix C: Equilibrium in the single city case.
C.1. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoff md. To see that there exists a
unique equilibrium cutoff md, we apply the Leibniz integral rule to the left-hand side of
(14) and use W (e) = 1 to obtain
eL
(md)2
Z md
0
m2

W 2   1

W 0dG(m) > 0,
where the sign comes from W 0 > 0 and W 2  1 for 0  m  md. Hence, the left-hand
side of (14) is strictly increasing. This uniquely determines the equilibrium cutoff md,
because
lim
md!0
Z md
0
m

W 1 +W   2

dG(m) = 0 and lim
md!¥
Z md
0
m

W 1 +W   2

dG(m) = ¥.
C.2. Indirect utility in the single city. To derive the indirect utility, we first compute
the (unweighted) average price across all varieties. Multiplying both sides of (6) by p(i),
integrating over 
, and using (3), we obtain:
p = mw+
E
N
where m  (1/N) R
m(j)dj denotes the average marginal labor requirement of the
surviving firms. Using p, expression (4) can be rewritten as
U =
N
k+ 1
  S
L

md
, (A-3)
where we use E = (S/L)w, pd = mdw and m = [1/G(md)]
R md
0 mdG(m) = [k/(k +
1)]md. When combined with (17) and (18), we obtain the expression for U as given in
(19).
C.3. Single-peakedness of the indirect utility in the single city case. We now show
that U is single-peaked with respect to L. To this end, we rewrite the indirect utility (20)
as U = b(S/L)L1/(k+1), where b is a positive constant capturing k, , and max, and then
consider a log-transformation, lnU = ln b+ lnS   [k/(k+ 1)] lnL. It then follows that
@ lnU
@ lnL
=
LS 0
S
  k
k+ 1
.
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To establish single-peakedness, we need to show that
LS 0
S
=
2(L/)
2

e
p
L/   1  pL/

cuts the horizontal line k/(k + 1) 2 (0, 1) only once from above. Notice that LS 0/S ! 1
as L! 0, whereas LS 0/S ! 0 as L! ¥. Single-peakedness therefore follows if
d
dL

LS 0
S

=  2+ 
p
L/+ e
p
L/  pL/  2
(4/2)
hp


e
p
L/   1

  pL
i2 < 0, 8L.
For this to be the case, the numerator must be positive. Let y  pL/ > 0. Then we
can show that H(y)  2+ y + ey(y   2) > 0 for all y > 0. Obviously, H(0) = 0. So, if
H 0 > 0 for all y > 0, the proof is complete. It is readily verified that H 0 = 1+ yey   ey > 0
is equivalent to e y > 1  y, which is true for all y > 0 by convexity of e y (observe that
1  y is the tangent to e y at y = 0 and that a convex function is everywhere above its
tangent).
Appendix D: Equilibrium in the urban system.
D.1. Equilibrium conditions using the Lambert W function. By definition, the zero
expected profit condition for each firm in city r is given by
å
s
Ls
Z mxrs
0
[prs(m)  rsmwr] qrs(m)dGr(m) = Fwr. (D-1)
Furthermore, each labor market clears in equilibrium, which requires that
NEr

å
s
Lsrs
Z mxrs
0
mqrs(m)dGr(m) + F

= Sr. (D-2)
Last, in equilibrium trade must be balanced for each city
NEr å
s 6=r
Ls
Z mxrs
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m) = Lr å
s 6=r
NEs
Z mxsr
0
psr(m)qsr(m)dGs(m). (D-3)
We now restate the foregoing conditions (D-1)–(D-3) in terms of the LambertW function.
First, using (9), the labor market clearing condition can be rewritten as follows:
NEr

1
ås
Lsrs
Z mxrs
0
m

1 W

e
m
mxrs

dGr(m) + F

= Sr. (D-4)
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Second, plugging (9) into (D-1), zero expected profits require that
1
ås
Lsrs
Z mxrs
0
m
"
W

e
m
mxrs
 1
+W

e
m
mxrs

  2
#
dGr(m) = F . (D-5)
Last, the trade balance condition is given by
NEr wr å
s 6=r
Lsrs
Z mxrs
0
m
"
W

e
m
mxrs
 1
  1
#
dGr(m)
= Lr å
s 6=r
NEs srws
Z mxsr
0
m
"
W

e
m
mxsr
 1
  1
#
dGs(m). (D-6)
Applying the city-specific Pareto distribution Gr(m) = (m/mmaxr )
k to (D-4)–(D-6) yields,
using the results of Appendix B, expressions (21)–(23) given in the main text.
D.2. The mass of varieties consumed in the urban system. Using N cr as defined in (8),
and the external cutoff and the mass of entrants as given by (7) and (24), and making use
of the Pareto distribution, we obtain:
N cr =
2
1 + 2

mdr
k
å
s
Ss
F (mmaxs )
k

rr
sr
wr
ws
k
=

1 + 2
 
mdr
k
rr
å
s
Ssrr

rr
sr
wr
ws
k 2
F (mmaxs )
k
.
Using the definition of maxs , and noting that the summation in the foregoing expression
appears in the equilibrium relationship (25), we can then express the mass of varieties
consumed in city r as given in (26).
D.3. The weighted average of markups in the urban system. Plugging (9) into the
definition (27), the weighted average of markups in the urban system can be rewritten as
r =
1
Er åsNEs Gs(mxsr)
å
s
NEs srws
Z mxsr
0
m

W 2  W 1

dGs(m),
where the argument em/mxsr of the Lambert W function is suppressed to alleviate no-
tation. As shown in Appendix B, the integral term is given by 3(mmaxs ) k(mxsr)k+1 =
3Gs(m
x
sr)m
x
sr. Using this, together with (7) and Er = (Sr/Lr)wr, yields the expression
in (27).
D.4. Indirect utility in the urban system. To derive the indirect utility, we first compute
the (unweighted) average price across all varieties sold in each market. Multiplying both
VI
sides of (6) by prs(i), integrating over 
rs, and summing the resulting expressions across
r, we obtain:
ps 
1
N cs
å
r
Z

rs
prs(j)dj =
1
N cs
å
r
rswr
Z

rs
mr(j)dj +
Es
N cs
,
where the first term is the average of marginal delivered costs. Under the Pareto dis-
tribution,
R

sr
ms(j)dj = NEs
R mxsr
0 mdGs(m) = [k/(k + 1)]m
x
srN
E
s Gs(m
x
sr). Hence, the
(unweighted) average price can be rewritten for city r as follows
pr =
1
N cr
å
s
srws

k
k+ 1

mxsrN
E
s Gs(m
x
sr) +
Er
N cr
=

k
k+ 1

pdr +
Er
N cr
, (D-7)
where we have used (8) and pdr = srwsmxsr. Plugging (D-7) into (4) and using (7), the
indirect utility is then given by
Ur =
N cr
k+ 1
  
rr
Sr
Lrmdr
,
which together with (26) and (27) yields (28).
Appendix E: The case with two cities.
E.1. Market equilibrium in the two city case. Recall that 12 = 21 =  , 11 = 22 = t,
and   t by assumption. For given city sizes L1 and L2, the market equilibrium is given
by a system of three equations (22)–(24) with three unknowns (the two internal cutoffs
md1 and m
d
2, and the relative wage !  w1/w2) as follows:
max1 = L1t

md1
k+1
+ L2

t

1
!
md2
k+1
(E-1)
max2 = L2t

md2
k+1
+ L1

t

!md1
k+1
(E-2)
!2k+1 =


 
md2
md1
!k+1
, (E-3)
where   max2 /max1 and   h2/h1 = (S2/L2)/(S1/L1).
When  > t, equations (E-1) and (E-2) can be uniquely solved for the cutoffs as a
function of !:
(md1)
k+1 =
max1
L1t
1  (t/ )k! (k+1)
1  (t/ )2k and (m
d
2)
k+1 =
max2
L2t
1   1(t/ )k!k+1
1  (t/ )2k . (E-4)
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Substituting the cutoffs (E-4) into (E-3) yields, after some simplification, the following
expression:
LHS  !k =  S1
S2
  (t/ )k !k+1
!k+1    (t/ )k  RHS. (E-5)
The RHS of (E-5) is non-negative if and only if ! < ! < !, where !  1/(k+1) (t/ )k/(k+1)
and !  1/(k+1) (/t)k/(k+1). Furthermore, the RHS is strictly decreasing in ! 2 (!,!)
with lim!!!+ RHS = ¥ and lim!!!  RHS = 0. Since the LHS of (E-5) is strictly in-
creasing in ! 2 (0,¥), there exists a unique equilibrium relative wage ! 2 (!,!). The
internal cutoffs are then uniquely determined by (E-4).
When  = t, we can also establish the uniqueness of !, md1 and m
d
2. The proof is
relegated to E.4 (i).
E.2. Market equilibrium: L1 > L2 implies ! > 1 and md1 < m
d
2. Assume that h1 =
h2 = h, 1 = 2 = , and  = 1. Observe that L1/L2 = 1 implies S1/S2 = 1, so that
the unique equilibrium wage is ! = 1 by (E-5) if the two cities are equally large. Now
suppose that city 1 is larger than city 2, L1/L2 > 1, which implies S1/S2 > 1. Then, the
equilibrium relative wage satisfies ! > 1 because an increase in S1/S2 raises the RHS
of (E-5) without affecting the LHS. Finally, expression (E-3), together with the foregoing
assumption, yields !2k+1 = (1/)
 
md2/m
d
1
k+1. As L1 > L2 implies ! > 1 and  > 1
(recall that h  S/L is decreasing in L), it follows that md1 < md2. Hence, the unique
market equilibrium is such that the larger city has the higher wage and the lower cutoff.
Note that the proof relies on (E-5), which is obtained under  > t. However, we can
establish the same properties for  = t by using the expressions in E.4 (i) below.
E.3. Spatial equilibrium: No urban frictions. We have claimed that the third and the
fourth term in (32) are negative becausemd1 < emd1 < emd2 < md2. To verify these inequalities,
notice at first that the reduction in  from any given positive value to zero raises S1/S2.
This is straightforward to prove: In a world with urban frictions (where  > 0), and given
that h1 = h2 = h and 1 = 2 = , the term S1/S2 is given by
S1
S2
=
1   1+ pL1/ e pL1/
1   1+ pL2/ e pL2/ . (E-6)
In a world without urban frictions ( = 0), we have eS1 = L1h and eS2 = L2h, so
that eS1/eS2 = L1/L2. Letting yr  pLr/ > 0, proving that L1/L2 is larger than
the term S1/S2 given in (E-6) is equivalent to proving that y21/ (1  e y1   y1e y1) >
VIII
y22/ (1  e y2   y2e y2). We thus need to show that y2/(1  e y   ye y) is increasing be-
cause y1 > y2. By differentiating, we have the derivative
ye y
(1  e y   ye y)2Y , where Y  2e
y   [(y+ 1)2 + 1].
Noting that Y = 0 at y = 0 and Y 0 = 2[ey   (y + 1)] > 0 for all y > 0, we know that the
derivative is positive for all y > 0. Hence, eS1/eS2 = L1/L2 > S1/S2. The elimination of
urban frictions thus raises S1/S2, and thereby the relative wage ! by shifting up the RHS
of (E-5). We hence observe wage divergence. The expressions in (E-4) then indeed imply
md1 < emd1 < emd2 < md2 as ! increases.
E.4. Spatial equilibrium: No trade frictions. Our aim is to show the condition fore <  to hold in (33), and we proceed in two steps. First, we show that the elimination
of trade frictions implies a lower cutoff in both regions. Second, we show under which
conditions the elimination of trade frictions lead to a decrease in P1.
(i) Setting  = t, the market equilibrium conditions (E-1)–(E-3) can be rewritten as
max1
t
= L1X1 + L2
X2


(E-7)
max2
t
= L2X2 + L1
X1 (E-8)

 =



X2
X1
 k+1
2k+1
, (E-9)
where X1  (md1)k+1, X2  (md2)k+1, and 
  !k+1. From (E-7) and (E-8), we thus have

max1 /t = 
max
2 /t = L1
X1 + L2X2. Hence, 
 =  must hold when  = t, and ! is
uniquely determined. We know by (E-9) that X2 = (/)

2k+1
k+1 X1 = 
k
k+1X1. Plugging
this expression into (E-7) yields the unique counterfactual cutoffs
eX1 = (emd1)k+1 = max1 /(L1t)
1+  
1
k+1 (L2/L1)
and eX2 = (emd2)k+1 = max2 /(L2t)
1+  1
1
k+1 (L1/L2)
.
(E-10)
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Establishing that eX1 < X1, i.e., that emd1 < md1 requires
1  (t/ )k! (k+1)
1  (t/ )2k >
1
1+  
1
k+1 (L2/L1)
)   1k+1

L2
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"
1  

t

k
! (k+1)
#
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
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
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k#
)   1k+1

S2
S1
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! (k+1)
"
!k+1   

t

k#
>

t

k
! (k+1)
"
 

t

k
!k+1
#
)   1k+1

t
k
> 

S1
S2

  (t/ )k!k+1
!k+1   (t/ )k = !
k,
where the last equality holds by (E-5). We thus need to prove k/(k+1)(/t)k > !k or
1/(k+1)(/t) > !, which is straightforward since 1/(k+1)(/t) > 1/(k+1)(/t)k/(k+1) 
! > !. Hence, emd1 < md1 must hold. Using a similar approach, it can be shown thatemd2 < md2. The elimination of trade frictions thus leads to lower cutoffs in both regions.
(ii) Now we want to show under which conditions we have e <  in (33). Let mdr 
mdr   emdr > 0. Then, proving h1(1/emd1   1/md1) < h2(1/emd2   1/md2) is equivalent to
proving that
h1m
d
1
md1 emd1 < h2m
d
2
md2 emd2 , m
d
1 emd1md2
md2 emd2md1 h2h1 > 1. (E-11)
This can be done by the following steps. First, we prove cutoff convergence, i.e., emd2/emd1 <
md2/m
d
1. Using (E-10), the counterfactual cutoff ratio is given by (emd2/emd1)k+1 = k/(k+1),
whereas using (E-4), the cutoff ratio with trade frictions is 
md2
md1
!k+1
=
L1
L2
1
! (k+1)
  (t/ )k!k+1
!k+1   (t/ )k =
L1
L2
1
! (k+1)
!k

S2
S1
=


!2k+1,
where we use (E-5) to obtain the second equality. Taking their difference, showing thatemd2/emd1 < md2/md1 boils down to showing that 1/(k+1) < ! at the market equilibrium.
This can be done by evaluating (E-5) at ! = 1/(k+1). The LHS is equal to k/(k+1), which
falls short of the RHS given by S1/S2 (because   1, k  1, and S1/S2 > 1). Since
the LHS is increasing and the RHS is decreasing, it must be that 1/(k+1) < !. Thus, we
have proved emd2/emd1 < md2/md1 . Turning to the second step, this cutoff convergence then
implies
md2
md1
>
emd2emd1 ) m
d
1
md2
md2
md1
> 1 )
 
md1
md2
emd1emd2 m
d
2
md1
h2
h1
! emd2emd1 h1h2 > 1. (E-12)
X
Recall from (E-11) that we ultimately want to prove that

md1
md2
emd1emd2 m
d
2
md1
h2
h1

> 1. A sufficient
condition for this to be satisfied, given condition (E-12), is that (emd2/emd1)(h1/h2)  1, i.e.,
that [k/(k+1)]1/(k+1)(1/) = [1/(k+1)/]k/(k+1)  1. This is the case if 1/(k+1)  . In
words, the elimination of trade frictions leads to a decrease in the size of the large city
if the two cities are not too different in terms of their technological possibilities. In the
simple case where  = 1, the large city always becomes smaller as  > 1.
Appendix F: Quantification – Data, procedure, and model fit.
F.1. Data. We summarize the data used for the quantification of our model.
(i) msa data. We construct a dataset for 356 msas (see Table 5 below for a full list). The
bulk of our msa-level data comes from the 2007 American Community Survey (acs) of
the us Census, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (bea), and from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (bls). The geographical coordinates of each msa are computed as the
centroid of its constituent counties’ geographical coordinates. The latter are obtained
from the 2000 us Census Gazetteer county geography file, and the msa-level aggregation
is carried out using the county-to-msa concordance tables for 2007. We then construct
our measure of distance between two msas as drs = cos 1
 
sin(latr) sin(lats)+ cos(jlonr 
lonsj) cos(latr) cos(lats)
 6, 378.137 using the great circle formula, where latr and lonr
are the geographical coordinates of the msa. The internal distance of an msa is defined as
drr  (2/3)
p
surfacer/ as in Redding and Venables (2004). All msa surface measures are
given in square kilometers and include only land surface of the msa’s forming counties.
That data is obtained from the 2000 us Census Gazetteer, and is aggregated from the
county to the msa level.
We further obtain total gross domestic product by msa from the bea metropolitan
gdp files. Total employment at the msa level is obtained from the 2007 bls employment
flat files (we use aggregate values for ‘All occupations’). Using gross domestic product,
total employment, and the average number of hours worked, we construct our measure
of average msa productivity (gdp per employee), which can be used as a proxy for 1/mdr
under the Pareto distribution. Wages at the msa level for 2007 are computed as total labor
expenses (compensation of employees plus employer contributions for employee pension
and insurance funds plus employer contributions for government social insurance) di-
vided by total msa employment. Data to compute total labor expenses is provided by
the bea.
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(ii) Amenity data. County-level data on natural amenities refer to the year 1999 and are
provided by the us Department of Agriculture (usda). The usda data includes six mea-
sures of climate, topography, and water area that reflect environmental attributes usually
valued by people. In our benchmark ols estimation of (35), we use the standardized
amenity score from that data as a proxy for our observed amenities Aor. We aggregate the
county-level amenities up to the msa level by using the county-to-msa concordance table
and by weighting each county by its share in the total msa land surface.
In the instrumental variable approach (described in more detail in Appendix G.2 be-
low) we additionally use information from the United States Geological Survey (usgs)
to compute three measures: the fraction of an msa underlain by sedimentary rock; the
fraction of an msa designated as seismic hazard; and the fraction designated as landslide
hazard (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2008). These variables, as well as their squared terms,
are used as instruments for bUr. Moreover, when conducting the 2sls estimation of (35),
we include a full battery of state dummies.
(iii) Urban frictions data. Data is taken from the 2007 acs which provides total msa popu-
lation, average weekly hours worked and average one-way commuting time in minutes.
Those pieces of information are used to compute the aggregate labor supply hrLr, and
the effective labor supply Sr.
(iv) Trade frictions data. Finally, we use aggregate bilateral trade flows Xrs from the 2007
Commodity Flow Survey (cfs) of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (bts) for the
lower 48 contiguous us states, as these are the states containing the msas that will be
used in our analysis. We work at the state level since msa trade flows from the cfs
public files can only be meaningfully exploited for a relatively small sample of large ‘cfs
regions’. The distance between r and s in kilometers is computed using the great circle
formula given above. In that case, latr and lonr denote the coordinates of the capital of
state r, measured in radians, which are taken from Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003)
dataset.
F.2. Quantification procedure: Market equilibrium. As explained in the main text, the
quantification procedure for the market equilibrium consists of five steps that we now
explain in detail.
(i) Urban frictions r. To obtain the city-specific commuting technology parameters br that
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constitute urban frictions, we rewrite equation (12) as
Lr
hr
hr
=
2
2r
h
1 

1+ r
p
Lr/

e r
p
Lr/
i
, (F-1)
where we use Sr = Lrhr. We compute hr as the average number of hours worked per
week in msa r. The gross labor supply per capita, hr, which is the endowment of hours
available for work and commuting, is constructed as the sum of hr and hours per week
spent by workers in each msa for travel-to-work commuting in 2007. Given hr, hr, as well
as city size Lr, the above equation can be uniquely solved for the city-specific commuting
parameter br. Table 5 below provides the values for the 356 msas.
(ii) Trade frictions rs. To estimate the distance elasticity b that constitutes trade frictions,
we consider the value of sales from r to s:
Xrs = N
E
r Ls
Z mxrs
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m). (F-2)
Using (7), (9), (24), and the result from Appendix B.4, we then obtain the following grav-
ity equation: Xrs = SrLs krs k+1ss (ws/wr)
k+1wr
 
mds
k+1
(maxr )
 1. Turning to the specifi-
cation of trade costs rs, we stick to standard practice and assume that rs  drs, where
drs stands for the distance from r to s. The gravity equation can then be rewritten in
log-linear stochastic form:
lnXrs = const.  k ln drs + I0rs + 1r + 2s + "rs, (F-3)
where all terms specific to the origin and the destination are collapsed into fixed effects
1r and 2s , where I0rs is a zero-flow dummy, and "rs is an error term with the usual
properties for ols consistency.34 Using aggregate bilateral trade flows Xrs in 2007 for the
48 contiguous us states that cover all msas used in the subsequent analysis, we estimate
the gravity equation on state-to-state trade flows. Given a value of k, we then obtain an
estimate of the distance elasticity b that constitutes trade frictions.
(iii) Market equilibrium conditions (wr,maxr ). Observe that expressions (22) and (25) can be
rewritten as:
maxr = å
s
Lsrs

mds
ss
rs
ws
wr
k+1
(F-4)
Sr
Lr
1
(mdr)
k+1 = å
s
Ssrr

sr
rr
ws
wr
 k 1
maxs
. (F-5)
34There are 179 ‘zero flows’ out of 2,304 in the data, i.e., 7.7% of the sample. We control for them by using
a standard dummy-variable approach, where I0rs takes value 1 if Xrs = 0 and 0 otherwise.
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Ideally, we would use data on technological possibilities maxr to solve for the wages and
cutoffs. Yet, maxr is unobservable. We thus solve for wages and technological possibilities
(bwr, bmaxr ), given the values of mdr . More specifically, from data on gdp of msa r and the
total number of hours worked in that msa (hours worked per week times total employ-
ment) we compute the average msa productivity M r (gdp per employee), which can be
used as a proxy for 1/mdr under the Pareto distribution. Using the value of k, the cutoffs
mdr , the city-specific commuting technologies br, the observed msa populations Lr, as well
as trade frictions brs = dbrs, we can solve (F-4) and (F-5) for the wages and unobserved
technological possibilities (bwr, bmaxr ) that are consistent with the market equilibrium.
(iv) Firm size distribution and Pareto shape parameter k. The quantification procedure de-
scribed thus far has assumed a given value of the shape parameter k. To estimate k
structurally, we proceed as follows. First, given a value of k, we can compute trade fric-
tions brs and the wages and cutoffs (bwr, bmaxr ) as described before. This, together with
the internal cutoff mdr computed from data, yields the external cutoffs bmxrs by (7). With
that information in hand, we can compute the share br of surviving firms in each msa as
follows:
br  bNpr
ås bNps , where bNpr = bNEr Gr

max
s
bmxrs = 1 + 2Sr (bmaxr ) 1

max
s
bmxrsk
denotes the number of firms operating in msa r. The total effective labor supply Sr is
computed as described above in (i). Note that br is independent of the unobservable
constant scaling /(1 + 2) that multiplies the number of firms.
Second, we draw a large sample of firms from our calibrated msa-level productivity
distributions bGr(m) = (m/maxsfmxrsg)k. For that sample to be representative, we draw
firms in msa r in proportion to its share br. For each sampled firm with marginal labor
requirement m in msa r, we can compute its employment as follows:35
employmentr(m) = må
s
brsLsqrs(m) = m
 ås
brsLs 1 W e mbmxrs

,
where brs = 1 if m < bmxrs (the establishment can sell to msa s) and zero otherwise
(the establishment cannot sell to msa s). Since we can identify employment only up to
some positive constant (which depends on the unobservable ) we choose, without loss
of generality, that coefficient such that the average employment per firm in our sample
of establishments matches the observed average employment in the 2007 cbp. Doing so
35We exclude the labor used for shipping goods and the sunk initial labor requirement.
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allows us to readily compare the generated and observed data as we can sort the sampled
firms into the same size bins as those used for the observed firms. We use four standard
employment size bins from the cbp:  = {1–19, 20–99, 100–499, 500+} employees. LetNSIM
()
and NCBP
()
denote the number of firms in each size bin  in our sample and in the cbp,
respectively. Let also NSIM and NCBP denote our sample size and the observed number of
establishments in the cbp. Given a value of k, the following statistic is a natural measure
of the goodness-of-fit of the simulated establishment-size distribution:
SS(k) =
4
å
=1
"
NSIM
()
NSIM
 
NCBP
()
NCBP
#2
, (F-6)
the value of which depends on the chosen k. It is clear from (F-6) that we can choose
any large sample size NSIM since it would not affect the ratio NSIM
()
/NSIM. Without loss
of generality, we choose the sample size such that the total number of simulated firms
operating matches the observed total number of establishments (NSIM = NCBP). There
are 6,431,884 establishments across our 356 msas in the 2007 cbp, and we sample the same
number of firms from our quantified model.36 We finally choose k by minimizing SS(k).
The resulting model-based firm size distribution, together with the observed counterpart,
is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Cross-msa distribution of establishment numbers and average size – summary for ob-
served and simulated data.
Mean St.dev. Min Max Correlation
Variable Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model-Observed
# of establishments total 18067.10 18067.09 16878.09 43138.45 1738 911 109210 541255 0.7253
# of establishments size 1-19 15444.74 15461.97 12066.43 37449.79 1550 804 79181 478618 0.3824
# of establishments size 20-99 2121.56 2162.09 6320.64 4728.28 49 93 52178 51310 0.9412
# of establishments size 100-499 429.83 397.50 1729.44 922.34 14 13 24365 9951 0.8890
# of establishments size 500+ 70.94 45.52 132.67 113.75 2 1 1509 1376 0.9320
Avg establishment size 11.73 15.40 11.63 2.60 0.90 6.40 131.88 23.70 0.1716
Notes: Model values are computed from a representative sample of 6,431,886 establishments.
F.3. Model fit. Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum
of the number of establishments (top part) and average establishment size (bottom part) at
the msa level, and the number of establishments is further broken down by employment
size. The last column of Table 1 reports the correlation between the observed and our
simulated data. As can be seen, the simple cross-msa correlation for the total number of
36Doing so allows for a direct comparison of NSIM
()
and NCBP
()
for each . The very small differences in the
aggregate numbers in Tables 1 and 2 are due to rounding as the number of firms has to be an integer.
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Figure 8: Micro-fit for cross-msa establishment-level shipments (kernel regressions on distance)
establishments is 0.7253, with a slightly larger rank correlation of 0.733. Furthermore, the
correlations between the observed and the predicted numbers of medium-sized and large
establishments across msas are high (between 0.889 and 0.9412).
We now provide details about our model fit with respect to trade frictions. Figure 8
above is analogous to Figures 1-3 in Hillberry and Hummels (2008) who provide micro
evidence on the spatial structure of firms’ shipping patterns. The figure reports kernel
regressions of various predicted shipment characteristics on distance. Specifically, we
consider that the value of sales from an establishment in city r to city s represents one
shipment characterized by an originmsa, a destinationmsa, a shipping value, a unit price,
and a shipping distance. We then draw a representative sample of 40,000 establishments
from all msas, which yields a total of 40, 000 3562 potential shipments.37 Most of these
shipments do of course not occur, and there are only 243,784 positive shipments in our
37The sample size is immaterial for our results provided that it is large enough. Given that the number
of shipments is substantially larger than the number of firms, drawing a large sample of 6.5 million firms
as before proves computationally infeasible.
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Table 2: Shipment shares and shipping distances – summary for observed and simulated data.
Employment Number of establishments Shipment shares by distance shipped to destination Mean distance shipped
< 100 miles 100–500 miles > 500 miles
Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Model (wgt)
All 6,431,884 6,431,886 0.261 0.506 0.288 0.277 0.348 0.217 529.6 71.98 739.8
1–19 5,504,463 5,498,328 0.561 0.984 0.204 0.016 0.194 0.000 327.2 38.5 61.2
20–99 769,705 755,275 0.382 0.835 0.288 0.162 0.276 0.004 423.8 157.9 194.4
100–499 141,510 153,021 0.254 0.420 0.318 0.440 0.342 0.139 520.4 556.0 740.3
500+ 16,206 25,255 0.203 0.079 0.272 0.332 0.388 0.590 588.6 1450.6 1519.1
Notes: Shipping distance and shipping share columns are adapted from calculations by Holmes and Stevens (2012, Table 1) who use confidential Census
microdata from the 1997 Commodity Flow Survey. The small difference (of 2 units) between the observed and model total number of establishments is due to
rounding in our sampling procedure. The last column reports distances shipped weighted by establishments’ sales shares in total sales.
sample. As in Hillberry and Hummels (2008), we then use a Gaussian kernel with optimal
bandwidth and calculated on 100 points.
We illustrate the results for distances greater than about 10miles (the minimum in our
sample) and up to slightly below 3,000 miles (the maximum in our sample). Note that
we have less variation in distances than Hillberry and Hummels (2008) who use either
3-digit or 5-digit zip code level data instead of msa data. In line with the micro evidence
presented in Hillberry and Hummels (2008), we find that both aggregate shipment values
and the number of shipments predicted by our model fall off very quickly with distance
– becoming very small beyond a threshold of about 200 miles – whereas price per unit
first rises with distance and average shipment values do not display a clear pattern.
Finally, we compare shipping shares and shipping distances by establishment size
class predicted by our model, and their empirically observed counterparts. The former
are obtained as follows. First, for each establishment with labor requirement m in msa r,
we compute the value of its sales:
salesr(m) =å
s
rsLsprs(m)qrs(m) =
bwrm
 ås
rsLsd
b
rs[W (em/bmxrs) 1   1].
We then classify all 6,431,886 establishments in our sample by employment size class, and
disaggregate the value of sales for each establishment by distance shipped to compute
the shares reported in Table 2.38 The observed patterns in Table 2 come from Holmes and
Stevens (2012) who use confidential cfs microdata from 1997 to compute the shares of
shipping values by distance as well as average shipping distances. As can be seen, our
model can qualitatively reproduce the observed shipment shares, and it can also explain
the tendency that the mean distance shipped increases with establishment size.
38Since we work with shares, the unobservable scaling parameter  does not affect our results.
XVII
Appendix G: Spatial equilibrium.
G.1. Unique solution for Dr. Letting Dr = (Ur +Ar)/, the spatial equilibrium condi-
tion can be written as
exp(Dr)
åKs=1 exp(Ds)
=
Lr
åKs=1 Ls
, with D1 = 0. (G-1)
Taking the ratio for regions r and 1, we have
exp(Dr)
exp(D1)
= exp(Dr) =
Lr
L1
, 8r. (G-2)
Hence, Dr is uniquely determined as Dr = ln(Lr/L1) for all r.
G.2. Instrumental variable approach. In the instrumental variable (iv) approach to
estimating (35), the second-stage specification is as follows:
bDr = 0 + 1bU instrr + 2Aor + s(r) + "r, (G-3)
where Aor is the usda amenity score (observed amenities); and where s(r) (with msa r
belonging to state s) are state fixed effects (some msas cover several states, in which case
they have separate ‘state’ dummies). We cluster standard errors at the state level. Here,bU instrr is the instrumented value of utility of msa r, which is obtained from the following
first-stage regression
bUr = 0 + 1SEDIM_ROCKr + 2LANDSLIDEr + 3SEISMIC_HAZARDr (G-4)
+4SEDIM_ROCK2r + 5LANDSLIDE
2
r + 6SEISMIC_HAZARD
2
r + 7A
o
r + s(r) + "r,
where SEDIM_ROCKr, LANDSLIDEr and SEISMIC_HAZARDr are the three geological
instruments as described in Appendix F.1 (see also Rosenthal and Strange, 2008).
The results from the 2sls regression are reported in Table 3. As one can see, our
instruments are strong and the second-stage coefficient on the instrumented utility is
significant at the 1% level.
With these estimates in hand, we then decompose bDr as follows:
bDr = b2SLS1 bUr + b2SLS0 + b2SLS2 Aor + bs(r)| {z }
observed amenities
+ b"r|{z}
unobserved amenities
(G-5)
where b"r is a residual allowing the right-hand side to match the left-hand side. We
hold b2SLS1 and both observed and unobserved amenities in (G-5) constant during the
counterfactual experiments and use the changes in bUr to construct the changes in bDr.
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Table 3: iv estimation results.
Coefficient p-value
Second stagebUr (instrumented) 2.8416 0.0050
(1.0166)
Natural amenities score 0.0404 0.2940
(0.0384)
State fixed effects Yes
Second-stage centered R2 0.3575
Second-stage uncentered R2 0.5506
First stage
Sedimentary rock 0.0990 0.4050
0.1183
Sedimentary rock squared  0.0326 0.7680
(0.1102)
Landslide  0.0081 0.9240
(0.0841)
Landslide squared  0.0036 0.8870
(0.0249)
Seismic hazard  0.0053 0.0940
(0.0031)
Seismic hazard squared 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0000)
Natural amenities score 0.0078 0.0890
(0.0046)
State fixed effects Yes
First-stage centered R2 0.4727
First-stage uncentered R2 0.9775
Number of excluded instruments 6
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 6.147
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 16.37
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 3.91
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors (by state) in parentheses.
Regressions for N = 356 observations.  ,  , and  denote
coefficient significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Appendix H: Numerical procedure for counterfactuals.
For simplicity, we only explain the procedure for the ‘no urban frictions’ case, as it works
analogously for the ‘no trade frictions’ scenario. First, we let br = 0 for all r and keep
the initial population distribution fixed. This parameter change induces changes in the
indirect utility levels. Let eU0r denote the new counterfactual utility in msa r, evaluated
at the initial population and br = 0. Second, we replace bUr with its new counterfactual
value eU0r to obtain eD0r = b0 + b1eU0r + b2Aor + b"r. The spatial equilibrium conditions (34)
will then, in general, no longer be satisfied, and hence city sizes must change.
We thus consider the following iterative adjustment procedure to find the new coun-
terfactual spatial equilibrium:
1. Given the values of eD0r , induced by the change in spatial frictions, the new choice
probabilities are uniquely determined as follows:
eP0r = exp(eD0r)
ås exp(eD0s) , (H-1)
which yields a unique new population distribution eL0r = LeP0r for all r = 1, ...,K.
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2. Given the intial bmaxr , the new population distribution eL0r for all r = 1, ...,K, as well
as the counterfactual value for the commuting technology parameter br = 0, the
market equilibrium conditions are uniquely solved for the new (relative) wages and
cutoffs few1r , (emdr)1g. Expression (28) then yields new utility levels eU1r .
3. Using eD1r = b0 + b1eU1r + b2Aor + b"r, the choice probabilities can be updated as in
(H-1), which yields a new population distribution eL1r = LeP1r for all r = 1, ...,K.
4. We iterate over steps 2–3 until convergence of the population distribution to obtain
feLr, ewr, emdrg for all r = 1, ...,K.
Appendix I: Robustness checks.
I.1. Agglomeration economies. We illustrate a simple way to extend our framework to
include agglomeration economies. Specifically, we allow the upper bound in each msa,
mmaxr , to be a function of the population of that msa. Agglomeration economies are thus
modeled as a right-shift in the ex ante productivity distribution: upon entry, a firm in
a larger msa has a higher probability of getting a better productivity draw.39 Starting
from the baseline model, assume that technological possibilities maxr can be expressed
as maxr = c  L kr   maxr , where  is the size elasticity of the ex ante upper bound of the
marginal labor requirement, and where  maxr is an unobserved idiosyncratic measure of
technological possibilities that is purged from agglomeration effects. We can then estimate
the ex ante productivity advantage of large cities by running a simple log-log regression
of bmaxr on msa population and controls as follows:
ln(bmaxr ) = 0 + 1 lnLr +Xrb+ er,
where bmaxr can be obtained from the quantification of the initial equilibrium, Lr is the
city’s population, Xr is a vector of city-specific controls, and er is an idiosyncratic error
term with the usual properties.40 The estimate b1 of the key parameter is  0.2843, with
standard error 0.1093. Since lnmaxr equals k lnmmaxr plus a constant, the elasticity  of
mmaxr with respect to population is given by 0.2843/bk = 0.0444 which is the value we
39Formally, the right-shift in the ex ante productivity distribution implies that the distribution in a larger
msa first-order stochastically dominates that in a smaller msa. Observe that firm selection afterwards acts
as a truncation, so that the ex post distribution is both right-shifted and truncated.
40To account for density effects, we control for the log of the city’s surface in the regression. We also
include a set of state-level fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the state level. Some msas cover
several states, in which case they have separate ‘state’ dummies.
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use in what follows. In words, doubling msa population reduces the upper bound (and,
equivalently, the mean by the properties of the Pareto distribution) of the ex antemarginal
labor requirement of entrants by 4.44%.41
Those agglomeration economies can be incorporated into our counterfactual experi-
ments as follows. As mentioned above, we compute bmaxr in the initial equilibrium. Call
it bmax,0r . Assume now that the population of msa r changes from L0r to L1r. The newbmaxr is then given by bmax,1r = c  (L1r) k  b maxr . Hence, it is easy to see that, given the
initial estimates bmax,0r we have bmax,1r = bmax,0r  L1r/L0r k. Thus, we can integrate ag-
glomeration economies in a straightforward way into our framework by replacing bmaxr
by bmaxr  L1r/L0r k in the market equilibrium conditions (F-4) and (F-5) when running
the counterfactuals:
bmaxr L1rL0r
 k
= å
s
L1srs

mds
ss
rs
ws
wr
k+1
(I-1)
S1r
L1r
1
(mdr)
k+1 = å
s
S1srr

sr
rr
ws
wr
 k 1
bmaxs L1sL0s k
. (I-2)
We then run both counterfactuals (‘no urban frictions’ and ‘no trade frictions’) with the
agglomeration economies specification. The results are summarized in the middle panel
of Table 4 (labeled cf3 and cf4, respectively); and in the bottom panel for the case of the
iv approach (labeled cf7 and cf8, respectively). As can be seen, the results change little
compared to our specifications without agglomeration economies (reported in cf1, cf2,
cf5, and cf6).
I.2. Relative weight of the indirect utility and amenities. Recall that the value of 1
in (35) determines the relative weight of the indirect utility and amenities in individual
location decisions. To identify 1, we impose in our benchmark that "r is orthogonal tobUr. However, any correlation between bUr and "r will lead to a biased estimate of this
weight. Hence, it could be the case that our relatively small population movements in
response to shocks to spatial frictions are driven by too low an estimate of 1.
We show that our main results are robust, both qualitatively and to a large extent
quantitatively, to higher values of 1. One way to explore this possibility is to simply
double the coefficient as in our discussion paper (see Behrens et al., 2013). In this ap-
pendix, we consider an instrumental variable approach similar to that in Rosenthal and
41That figure, though computed for the ex ante distribution, lies within the consensus range of previous
elasticity estimates for agglomeration economies measured using ex post productivity distributions (see,
e.g., Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Melo et al., 2009).
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Table 4: Summary of the counterfactuals.
Baseline counterfactuals (ols, no agglomeration economies)
No urban frictions (cf1) No trade frictions (cf2)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change in average productivity (Mr ) -0.06 0.26 0.04 78.50 14.26 67.59
% change in population (Lr ) -2.15 3.60 0 4.30 15.28 0
% change in average markup (r ) -8.79 1.82 -9.85 -43.55 4.27 -39.90
% change in indirect utility (Vr ) 9.69 2.24 10.98 78.17 13.79 67.62
RS coefficient -0.9178 -0.9392
total population movement 3,944,976 10,209,349
Robustness checks (ols, with agglomeration economies)
No urban frictions (cf3) No trade frictions (cf4)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change in average productivity (Mr ) -0.15 0.34 0.04 78.82 14.72 67.65
% change in population (Lr ) -2.25 3.82 0 4.61 16.64 0
% change in average markup (r ) -8.71 1.93 -9.85 -43.62 4.36 -39.90
% change in indirect utility (Vr ) 9.59 2.38 10.98 78.46 14.16 67.65
RS coefficient -0.9175 -0.9395
total population movement 4,145,800 10,794,198
Robustness checks (2sls, no agglomeration economies)
No urban frictions (cf5) No trade frictions (cf6)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change in average productivity (Mr ) -0.17 0.43 0.05 78.83 14.33 67.87
% change in population (Lr ) -3.73 6.36 0 7.05 26.04 0
% change in average markup (r ) -8.69 1.95 -9.86 -43.61 4.21 -40.03
% change in indirect utility (Vr ) 9.57 2.41 11.00 78.34 13.60 67.95
RS coefficient -0.9120 -0.9359
total population movement 6,989,034 16,098,780
Robustness checks (2sls, with agglomeration economies)
No urban frictions (cf7) No trade frictions (cf8)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change in average productivity (Mr ) -0.35 0.66 0.05 79.35 15.11 67.98
% change in population (Lr ) -4.04 7.17 0 7.92 30.23 0
% change in average markup (r ) -8.52 2.16 -9.85 -43.73 4.34 -40.05
% change in indirect utility (Vr ) 9.38 2.68 11.00 78.80 14.15 68.08
RS coefficient -0.9109 -0.9388
total population movement 7,692,526 17,628,398
Notes: Weighted mean refers to the mean percentage change where the weights are given by the msas’ initial population shares.
The counterfactual scenarios cf3, cf4, cf7, and cf8 include the agglomeration economies specification. The counterfactual
scenarios cf5, cf6, cf7, and cf8 use the results from the instrumental variable estimation of (35), see Appendix G.2. RS
coefficient refers to the slope of the estimated rank-size relationship.
Strange (2008), where bUr is instrumented with geological variables measuring the suit-
ability of a city for building constructions (see Appendices F.1(ii) and G.2 for details).
As outlined in Rosenthal and Strange (2008), the problem is that unobservable char-
acteristics that impact on location decisions are likely to be correlated with the level of
economic activity. Higher unobservable amenities lead to more population which affects
productivity and in turn indirect utility. The solution they propose is to use instruments
that can predict the level of economic activity in a certain location but do not directly
affect location decisions and are, therefore, uncorrelated with unobservable amenities.
These variables should thus affect location decisions only via their impact on economic
activity as measured by bUr. The corresponding 2sls estimation attributes a larger weight
to market interactions and yields a higher sensitivity to economic determinants of loca-
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Figure 9: Rank-size rule, observed and counterfactual (cf5, left; and cf6, right)
tion choices (b2SLS1 = 2.8416 instead of bOLS1 = 1.7481).42 See Behrens et al. (2013) for
the robustness of our results when we use 2 bOLS1 = 3.4962, which is even larger thanb2SLS1 that we use as a robustness check here.
Using this larger value of 1 and the associated smaller unobserved amenities, we
run the same counterfactual experiments as before and look at how different the implied
changes are. The results are summarized in the bottom panel of Table 4 (labeled cf5 and
cf6).43 As can be seen, in the iv counterfactual experiments there is a larger population
reshuffling. More specifically, in the ‘no urban frictions’ counterfactual, roughly 75%
more people relocate across cities compared to our benchmark, and roughly 60% more in
the ‘no trade frictions’ case. Also the changes in individual city sizes span a much wider
range than before. These findings are intuitive because a larger value of 1 makes agents
more sensitive to differences in prices, wages, and consumption diversity across msas.
Despite these larger population movements, the city-size distribution remains fairly
stable in both counterfactuals (see Figure 9). When urban frictions are eliminated, the
Zipf coefficient changes from -0.9249 to -0.9120, implying a slightly higher population
concentration in large cities. When ‘trade frictions’ are eliminated, the Zipf coefficient
changes from -0.9249 to -0.9359, implying a slightly lower population concentration in
large cities. Moreover, the predictions of how spatial frictions affect productivity and
42As we will see, the larger coefficient on indirect utility induces larger population movements under
iv than under ols. The qualitative results are, however, identical and the quantitative results other than
population movement hardly change. Observe also that the correlation between population and unobserved
amenities in the iv approach is 0.5520, which is smaller compared to 0.7023 in the ols case.
43For completeness, we also report results for the counterfactuals with both iv and agglomeration exter-
nalities (cf7 and cf8) in Table 4.
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Figure 10: Changes in the city-size distribution (equal amenities case)
markups are very similar to our benchmark.
Our above findings suggest that our main results are robust, both qualitatively and
to a large extent quantitatively, to higher values of 1. In particular, amenities do not
matter for the city-size distribution to remain stable between the initial and counterfactual
equilibria because that distribution is hardly affected even when we greatly reduce the
importance of amenities relative to the indirect utility in consumers’ location choices.
However, amenities do matter for replicating the observed initial city-size distribu-
tion. To see this, we briefly consider a similar counterfactual exercise as in Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (2013) and set all unobserved amenities across cities equal to their mean,
holding all spatial frictions fixed. Figure 10 shows that there would be a substantial tilt
of the city-size distribution. The Zipf coefficient falls from -0.9249 to -3.6715, and about a
half of the us msa population move, leading to a much less unequal city-size distribution
– large cities shrink and small cities grow.44
Appendix J: Additional results.
44We also experimented with setting all technological possibilities equal to the mean. In that case, 5.57%
of the population moves and there is no strong impact on the city-size distribution.
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Table 5: msa variables and descriptive statistics for the initial equilibrium.
fips msa name State Lr/L bmaxr Mr br Aor b"r
10180 Abilene TX 0.2268 6.8852 1.1412 0.3925 1.3141 -0.6556
10420 Akron OH 0.9956 17.4352 1.1254 0.2473 -2.2749 1.0062
10500 Albany GA 0.2336 28.3000 0.9842 0.4608 -0.0435 -0.4451
10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy NY 1.2149 15.6558 1.1952 0.2015 -0.2432 1.1317
10740 Albuquerque NM 1.1889 11.6475 1.1914 0.2232 3.7322 0.9275
10780 Alexandria LA 0.2133 14.7747 1.0459 0.5445 -0.2067 -0.5842
10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton PA-NJ 1.1444 22.9469 1.1892 0.3088 0.3026 0.9760
11020 Altoona PA 0.1787 28.9660 0.9424 0.5223 -0.8600 -0.7009
11100 Amarillo TX 0.3449 7.1209 1.1381 0.3277 1.6304 -0.2289
11180 Ames IA 0.1207 0.7978 1.3453 0.6556 -3.5400 -1.1175
11300 Anderson IN 0.1869 6.1621 1.1301 0.8718 -3.4700 -0.6463
11340 Anderson SC 0.2562 16.3593 1.0337 0.5571 0.7100 -0.4872
11460 Ann Arbor MI 0.4983 2.9986 1.3345 0.2977 -2.1900 0.1721
11500 Anniston-Oxford AL 0.1610 13.1516 1.0181 0.5613 0.2200 -0.9536
11540 Appleton WI 0.3104 9.1579 1.0961 0.3684 -2.7304 -0.0904
11700 Asheville NC 0.5756 31.3698 1.0427 0.3163 2.1012 0.2978
12020 Athens-Clarke County GA 0.2668 15.4460 1.0768 0.4865 -1.0511 -0.3069
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta GA 7.5152 7.9312 1.4838 0.1174 0.2253 2.7880
12100 Atlantic City-Hammonton NJ 0.3853 4.3460 1.2672 0.3301 -0.0400 -0.2364
12220 Auburn-Opelika AL 0.1858 14.1079 1.0001 0.6358 -0.2400 -0.7240
12260 Augusta-Richmond County GA-SC 0.7524 23.6409 1.1035 0.2920 -0.0192 0.6829
12420 Austin-Round Rock TX 2.2752 5.6156 1.3675 0.1860 1.6141 1.5231
12540 Bakersfield CA 1.1257 8.3291 1.3486 0.2453 4.8400 0.6741
12580 Baltimore-Towson MD 3.7983 12.0935 1.3507 0.1519 -0.3557 2.1378
12620 Bangor ME 0.2118 5.6207 1.1110 0.5506 -0.5200 -0.5302
12700 Barnstable Town MA 0.3163 2.9345 1.1726 0.4759 1.5200 -0.4993
12940 Baton Rouge LA 1.0962 3.7242 1.3720 0.2569 -0.6186 0.9311
12980 Battle Creek MI 0.1945 7.2642 1.1375 0.4982 -2.7300 -0.6453
13020 Bay City MI 0.1531 6.5755 1.0662 0.7995 -1.5300 -0.9167
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur TX 0.5356 8.3601 1.1884 0.2801 0.9407 0.1728
13380 Bellingham WA 0.2748 1.1589 1.3356 0.4955 5.2600 -0.7955
13460 Bend OR 0.2193 2.3869 1.2328 0.4620 6.1000 -1.0336
13740 Billings MT 0.2131 7.1640 1.0636 0.3735 2.4532 -0.6830
13780 Binghamton NY 0.3508 56.9535 0.9409 0.3785 -0.9289 0.0588
13820 Birmingham-Hoover AL 1.5777 5.8973 1.3723 0.2055 0.5780 1.2351
13900 Bismarck ND 0.1470 12.2467 0.9710 0.4403 -1.6258 -0.7564
13980 Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford VA 0.2244 10.1677 1.1161 0.5208 0.5141 -0.5979
14020 Bloomington IN 0.2616 14.7889 1.1155 0.5467 -0.4507 -0.3408
14060 Bloomington-Normal IL 0.2338 2.4247 1.3554 0.3871 -3.5700 -0.4375
14260 Boise City-Nampa ID 0.8367 10.6193 1.1636 0.2399 2.2919 0.6976
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MA-NH 6.3819 2.7007 1.6266 0.1098 0.1444 2.4955
14500 Boulder CO 0.4132 0.6188 1.5305 0.3373 5.8200 -0.6755
14540 Bowling Green KY 0.1651 12.3177 1.0554 0.5611 -0.2160 -0.8510
14740 Bremerton-Silverdale WA 0.3370 1.2068 1.4377 0.7249 2.6100 -0.6981
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk CT 1.2742 0.0329 2.5112 0.2506 2.2500 -0.2081
15180 Brownsville-Harlingen TX 0.5512 55.3719 0.8101 0.3178 2.4600 0.3482
15260 Brunswick GA 0.1449 13.3594 1.0310 0.6313 1.3530 -1.0593
15380 Buffalo-Niagara Falls NY 1.6061 15.4178 1.1271 0.1730 -0.6399 1.4505
15500 Burlington NC 0.2069 16.5166 1.0109 0.6324 -0.9600 -0.6176
15540 Burlington-South Burlington VT 0.2952 2.2778 1.2371 0.4271 -0.1238 -0.3845
15940 Canton-Massillon OH 0.5797 27.4059 1.0334 0.3382 -1.4796 0.4955
15980 Cape Coral-Fort Myers FL 0.8407 2.0378 1.3203 0.3210 5.2300 0.1676
16220 Casper WY 0.1021 0.0797 1.8677 0.4917 2.4900 -1.9697
16300 Cedar Rapids IA 0.3599 6.3374 1.1933 0.3126 -3.3035 0.0590
16580 Champaign-Urbana IL 0.3145 14.7922 1.1461 0.3848 -4.3383 0.0884
16620 Charleston WV 0.4327 6.2623 1.2677 0.3322 -0.7294 0.0286
16700 Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville SC 0.8970 8.8536 1.1909 0.2777 0.5686 0.7409
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord NC-SC 2.3512 0.6377 1.8070 0.1561 0.1000 1.3196
16820 Charlottesville VA 0.2744 7.2636 1.2334 0.4341 -0.0364 -0.4526
16860 Chattanooga TN-GA 0.7326 8.8814 1.2192 0.2830 0.2832 0.5342
16940 Cheyenne WY 0.1229 2.1311 1.2574 0.5112 3.0500 -1.4960
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet IL-IN-WI 13.5596 7.6522 1.5622 0.0867 -2.1021 3.4958
17020 Chico CA 0.3115 5.1269 1.1704 0.5341 5.1100 -0.5608
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown OH-KY-IN 3.0376 14.2620 1.2956 0.1438 -0.7916 2.0448
17300 Clarksville TN-KY 0.3727 1.4179 1.4612 0.5319 0.0733 -0.3729
17420 Cleveland TN 0.1582 3.0055 1.2491 0.7279 0.8781 -1.1302
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor OH 2.9846 7.3233 1.3479 0.1352 -1.4310 1.9676
17660 Coeur d’Alene ID 0.1914 8.3418 0.9814 0.6066 3.5000 -0.9011
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Table 5 (continued).
fips msa name State Lr/L bmaxr Mr br Aor b"r
17780 College Station-Bryan TX 0.2895 47.5407 0.9761 0.4095 0.8622 -0.2296
17820 Colorado Springs CO 0.8671 7.0613 1.2141 0.2838 5.3867 0.3780
17860 Columbia MO 0.2311 16.7125 1.0091 0.4196 0.1054 -0.4706
17900 Columbia SC 1.0194 22.2288 1.1406 0.2385 0.5017 0.9371
17980 Columbus GA-AL 0.4025 8.7851 1.1704 0.3100 -0.2353 -0.0490
18020 Columbus IN 0.1064 2.9595 1.2043 0.4856 -2.3800 -1.3775
18140 Columbus OH 2.4975 11.5892 1.3067 0.1398 -1.9162 1.8984
18580 Corpus Christi TX 0.5899 5.0627 1.1707 0.2746 2.8551 0.1577
18700 Corvallis OR 0.1159 0.1014 1.6653 0.7211 3.1000 -1.8133
19060 Cumberland MD-WV 0.1414 56.7425 0.9012 0.7389 1.0076 -0.9889
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington TX 8.7483 3.2987 1.6484 0.0923 0.6857 2.8079
19140 Dalton GA 0.1908 15.8567 1.0122 0.3339 0.4652 -0.8035
19180 Danville IL 0.1156 13.3585 1.0646 0.7748 -3.2100 -1.0515
19260 Danville VA 0.1506 34.1566 0.9627 0.6804 -0.3000 -0.8908
19340 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island IA-IL 0.5355 8.2798 1.2047 0.2759 -2.6893 0.4377
19380 Dayton OH 1.1895 14.1872 1.1840 0.1988 -2.1260 1.1962
19460 Decatur AL 0.2125 3.5335 1.2627 0.6612 0.7910 -0.8247
19500 Decatur IL 0.1548 2.7975 1.2112 0.4092 -2.7900 -0.9344
19660 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach FL 0.7124 22.2777 1.0226 0.3743 3.4500 0.3884
19740 Denver-Aurora CO 3.4326 2.2957 1.5781 0.1477 4.1942 1.7018
19780 Des Moines-West Des Moines IA 0.7782 2.2274 1.3921 0.2050 -2.0346 0.6429
19820 Detroit-Warren-Livonia MI 6.3602 8.3299 1.4224 0.1089 -1.6704 2.7501
20020 Dothan AL 0.1986 49.5100 0.8991 0.4212 -0.4149 -0.5370
20100 Dover DE 0.2168 1.9540 1.3732 0.5895 -0.0700 -0.8842
20220 Dubuque IA 0.1315 5.7814 1.0783 0.3977 -0.7900 -1.1171
20260 Duluth MN-WI 0.3905 18.6402 1.0958 0.3678 -0.8127 0.1938
20500 Durham NC 0.6828 0.8200 1.6361 0.2552 0.0966 0.1845
20740 Eau Claire WI 0.2247 12.7566 1.0431 0.4796 -2.6695 -0.3365
20940 El Centro CA 0.2304 19.7182 1.0788 0.4081 6.4500 -0.8598
21060 Elizabethtown KY 0.1589 3.7636 1.2184 0.5914 -0.8465 -1.0560
21140 Elkhart-Goshen IN 0.2818 9.4337 1.0857 0.2901 -2.7200 -0.2450
21300 Elmira NY 0.1253 16.7836 0.9593 0.6243 -1.1300 -1.0690
21340 El Paso TX 1.0459 2.2083 1.2705 0.2441 4.4600 0.5021
21500 Erie PA 0.3973 18.7253 1.0133 0.3204 -0.5700 0.0764
21660 Eugene-Springfield OR 0.4891 13.2218 1.0718 0.3197 4.2900 0.0543
21780 Evansville IN-KY 0.4979 8.0962 1.2141 0.2898 -1.6375 0.2844
22020 Fargo ND-MN 0.2739 4.1400 1.1461 0.3067 -4.5908 -0.0388
22140 Farmington NM 0.1743 0.2874 1.6723 0.5778 2.8300 -1.3307
22180 Fayetteville NC 0.4968 0.7242 1.5255 0.3601 -0.9161 -0.1293
22220 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers AR-MO 0.6203 13.9314 1.1278 0.2715 0.8552 0.4160
22380 Flagstaff AZ 0.1814 41.4362 1.0685 0.4704 4.9300 -0.8937
22420 Flint MI 0.6189 11.2936 1.1285 0.4086 -1.9000 0.4963
22500 Florence SC 0.2829 14.4850 1.0690 0.4358 -0.2137 -0.3219
22520 Florence-Muscle Shoals AL 0.2038 22.0682 0.9977 0.6420 0.8059 -0.6681
22540 Fond du Lac WI 0.1411 5.1570 1.1492 0.6231 -1.9200 -1.0104
22660 Fort Collins-Loveland CO 0.4094 9.8391 1.1367 0.3890 5.6200 -0.3039
22900 Fort Smith AR-OK 0.4124 21.2879 1.0816 0.3342 1.6228 -0.0124
23020 Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin FL 0.2584 0.3985 1.5286 0.4967 2.0100 -0.9455
23060 Fort Wayne IN 0.5838 20.3049 1.0802 0.2692 -3.0754 0.5929
23420 Fresno CA 1.2803 22.9506 1.1604 0.2171 6.0300 0.8406
23460 Gadsden AL 0.1469 27.7629 0.9140 0.7121 0.9600 -1.0397
23540 Gainesville FL 0.3660 7.8664 1.1250 0.3731 2.0892 -0.2095
23580 Gainesville GA 0.2565 4.7162 1.1488 0.6287 0.9600 -0.6703
24020 Glens Falls NY 0.1835 53.2073 0.9276 0.6495 -0.3136 -0.6305
24140 Goldsboro NC 0.1617 4.7743 1.1284 0.6350 -1.4100 -0.9470
24220 Grand Forks ND-MN 0.1391 7.5933 1.0521 0.4540 -4.2873 -0.6426
24300 Grand Junction CO 0.1980 14.4225 1.0036 0.5205 2.2600 -0.7599
24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming MI 1.1058 14.8202 1.1985 0.2091 -2.1226 1.1623
24500 Great Falls MT 0.1164 3.0799 1.0900 0.5633 2.2000 -1.3183
24540 Greeley CO 0.3470 11.1165 1.1707 0.6195 1.7000 -0.2422
24580 Green Bay WI 0.4287 7.7067 1.1493 0.2912 -1.3945 0.1489
24660 Greensboro-High Point NC 0.9944 12.2863 1.2010 0.2038 -0.2512 0.8794
24780 Greenville NC 0.2455 8.4053 1.1029 0.4570 -1.9108 -0.3848
24860 Greenville-Mauldin-Easley SC 0.8739 29.0690 1.0696 0.2293 1.3467 0.7392
25060 Gulfport-Biloxi MS 0.3296 3.7705 1.2257 0.4062 0.1310 -0.3076
25180 Hagerstown-Martinsburg MD-WV 0.3718 29.3045 1.0342 0.6204 0.3042 -0.0839
25260 Hanford-Corcoran CA 0.2119 4.4956 1.2082 0.5882 3.4800 -0.9992
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Table 5 (continued).
fips msa name State Lr/L bmaxr Mr br Aor b"r
25420 Harrisburg-Carlisle PA 0.7529 15.7008 1.1804 0.2220 -0.0004 0.5819
25500 Harrisonburg VA 0.1674 3.5773 1.2622 0.4938 1.2500 -1.0739
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford CT 1.6929 0.6312 1.8030 0.1934 1.4760 0.8809
25620 Hattiesburg MS 0.1967 14.5668 1.0382 0.6026 -0.2014 -0.6437
25860 Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton NC 0.5132 43.2249 0.9904 0.3150 1.5055 0.2302
25980 Hinesville-Fort Stewart GA 0.1022 0.0097 2.3505 1.4824 0.8063 -2.4818
26100 Holland-Grand Haven MI 0.3690 4.6934 1.1913 0.4246 -0.0400 -0.1742
26300 Hot Springs AR 0.1372 11.9767 0.9892 0.7581 1.6400 -1.1335
26380 Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux LA 0.2863 2.3685 1.3317 0.4086 0.3192 -0.5579
26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown TX 8.0123 0.7875 1.9559 0.1036 0.8426 2.4951
26580 Huntington-Ashland WV-KY-OH 0.4043 18.9859 1.0797 0.3638 -0.1699 0.0365
26620 Huntsville AL 0.5504 4.8277 1.2477 0.2864 -0.9066 0.2760
26820 Idaho Falls ID 0.1700 14.9270 0.9584 0.6242 1.7783 -0.8152
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel IN 2.4131 6.4117 1.3983 0.1453 -2.5367 1.8239
26980 Iowa City IA 0.2093 3.0028 1.2468 0.4185 -2.9476 -0.5311
27060 Ithaca NY 0.1439 7.6229 1.0802 0.5491 -0.2800 -0.9925
27100 Jackson MI 0.2321 5.6531 1.1899 0.6124 -2.4500 -0.4931
27140 Jackson MS 0.7603 9.3264 1.1970 0.2701 -0.6024 0.6792
27180 Jackson TN 0.1604 8.0248 1.0716 0.4913 -1.6345 -0.8225
27260 Jacksonville FL 1.8519 6.0828 1.3004 0.1930 2.0244 1.3020
27340 Jacksonville NC 0.2317 0.1526 1.6719 0.6158 0.7400 -1.3510
27500 Janesville WI 0.2272 17.1165 1.0296 0.5567 -2.6200 -0.3910
27620 Jefferson City MO 0.2074 21.2752 1.0394 0.4518 0.3296 -0.5943
27740 Johnson City TN 0.2755 15.4626 1.0432 0.4448 1.5055 -0.4559
27780 Johnstown PA 0.2064 47.5556 0.9152 0.5599 -0.2300 -0.5483
27860 Jonesboro AR 0.1657 19.0537 1.0048 0.4910 -2.2503 -0.6718
27900 Joplin MO 0.2438 33.7469 0.9232 0.4025 -1.3200 -0.2872
28020 Kalamazoo-Portage MI 0.4602 10.9030 1.1573 0.3422 -1.3239 0.2034
28100 Kankakee-Bradley IL 0.1576 66.9572 0.9281 0.7130 -3.3000 -0.6326
28140 Kansas City MO-KS 2.8265 9.2978 1.3318 0.1388 -1.3222 2.0201
28420 Kennewick-Pasco-Richland WA 0.3260 1.7999 1.2862 0.4454 0.7491 -0.3261
28660 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood TX 0.5268 2.1655 1.4005 0.3488 1.5578 -0.0822
28700 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol TN-VA 0.4323 20.7011 1.0819 0.3835 0.3622 0.0800
28740 Kingston NY 0.2589 38.4944 1.0444 0.7757 0.7000 -0.4394
28940 Knoxville TN 0.9702 10.7076 1.1830 0.2284 1.0960 0.7774
29020 Kokomo IN 0.1421 4.4454 1.1801 0.4794 -4.4522 -0.9032
29100 La Crosse WI-MN 0.1864 15.4794 0.9862 0.4276 -1.1484 -0.6119
29140 Lafayette IN 0.2736 6.6786 1.2283 0.4269 -3.4119 -0.2047
29180 Lafayette LA 0.3652 0.3936 1.5540 0.3333 -0.9092 -0.4845
29340 Lake Charles LA 0.2732 0.2160 1.7799 0.4158 0.1230 -0.8452
29460 Lakeland-Winter Haven FL 0.8182 41.3451 1.0056 0.3320 3.9800 0.5254
29540 Lancaster PA 0.7096 23.6630 1.1151 0.2773 0.4500 0.4974
29620 Lansing-East Lansing MI 0.6498 8.5097 1.2380 0.3102 -3.3358 0.6664
29700 Laredo TX 0.3319 40.7539 0.9025 0.3942 1.1200 -0.0710
29740 Las Cruces NM 0.2830 14.1950 1.0495 0.4945 4.7700 -0.5204
29820 Las Vegas-Paradise NV 2.6143 5.7538 1.3678 0.1449 4.8600 1.4990
29940 Lawrence KS 0.1616 9.0883 1.0225 0.6893 0.3600 -0.9008
30020 Lawton OK 0.1620 1.7247 1.2588 0.4717 2.2900 -1.2620
30140 Lebanon PA 0.1821 21.6701 1.0004 0.6784 -0.6600 -0.7918
30340 Lewiston-Auburn ME 0.1521 6.7201 1.0069 0.6650 -0.3200 -0.9631
30460 Lexington-Fayette KY 0.6366 7.4339 1.2161 0.2408 -2.0342 0.5128
30620 Lima OH 0.1498 6.3170 1.0933 0.4620 -2.3700 -0.9154
30700 Lincoln NE 0.4160 6.3780 1.1229 0.2917 -2.8183 0.2242
30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway AR 0.9487 8.6504 1.2323 0.2235 -0.0673 0.8521
30860 Logan UT-ID 0.1724 17.5016 0.9483 0.6184 2.2845 -0.8079
30980 Longview TX 0.2899 3.1890 1.2889 0.4235 1.0970 -0.5565
31020 Longview WA 0.1430 5.9983 1.1138 0.8130 4.5400 -1.3338
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana CA 18.3301 4.3306 1.6868 0.0708 10.0712 2.8862
31140 Louisville/Jefferson County KY-IN 1.7564 14.2754 1.2532 0.1752 -0.7687 1.5113
31180 Lubbock TX 0.3804 12.8002 1.0110 0.3094 1.7950 -0.0905
31340 Lynchburg VA 0.3468 21.0406 1.0961 0.4312 0.4764 -0.1345
31420 Macon GA 0.3272 31.5646 1.0212 0.3784 0.9051 -0.1751
31460 Madera CA 0.2086 6.7275 1.2184 0.8123 6.0000 -1.0943
31540 Madison WI 0.7910 4.1702 1.3437 0.2343 -0.4945 0.6170
31700 Manchester-Nashua NH 0.5727 0.1167 1.9944 0.5151 0.0700 -0.3611
31900 Mansfield OH 0.1789 33.4517 0.9223 0.4979 -2.8800 -0.5658
32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission TX 1.0115 78.4494 0.8243 0.2479 0.4600 1.0886
32780 Medford OR 0.2837 7.3664 1.0610 0.3762 4.5000 -0.5412
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32820 Memphis TN-MS-AR 1.8230 5.5326 1.3539 0.1653 -0.7140 1.4824
32900 Merced CA 0.3495 3.4046 1.3438 0.6661 4.5100 -0.5673
33100 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach FL 7.7064 5.1829 1.4740 0.1063 5.2315 2.4562
33140 Michigan City-La Porte IN 0.1563 21.9162 1.0128 0.6279 -1.8700 -0.8200
33260 Midland TX 0.1800 0.0677 1.7699 0.3498 1.4200 -1.5392
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis WI 2.1987 5.9256 1.3133 0.1410 -1.7072 1.6745
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI 4.5673 4.2763 1.4626 0.1133 -2.1830 2.4717
33540 Missoula MT 0.1504 2.8725 1.1210 0.4512 1.7400 -1.0344
33660 Mobile AL 0.5757 9.1311 1.0984 0.3067 1.5200 0.2423
33700 Modesto CA 0.7278 6.4113 1.2548 0.4128 7.2100 0.0268
33740 Monroe LA 0.2453 9.2380 1.0825 0.4184 0.3390 -0.5074
33780 Monroe MI 0.2187 2.0031 1.3360 0.9408 -1.4300 -0.7490
33860 Montgomery AL 0.5210 12.6484 1.1449 0.3087 0.4625 0.2498
34060 Morgantown WV 0.1677 4.0622 1.2569 0.6007 -0.5645 -0.9222
34100 Morristown TN 0.1916 17.5432 0.9983 0.6252 1.4428 -0.8147
34580 Mount Vernon-Anacortes WA 0.1657 0.7668 1.4170 0.7719 4.9400 -1.4000
34620 Muncie IN 0.1643 21.3999 0.9605 0.5363 -2.6000 -0.6699
34740 Muskegon-Norton Shores MI 0.2483 10.5424 1.0442 0.4962 -0.4000 -0.4569
34820 Myrtle Beach-North Myrtle Beach-Conway SC 0.3558 14.1273 1.0296 0.3492 0.8800 -0.1685
34900 Napa CA 0.1887 0.7977 1.5290 0.6025 7.5300 -1.5827
34940 Naples-Marco Island FL 0.4496 0.8553 1.5056 0.3608 5.0000 -0.4961
34980 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin TN 2.1660 8.8103 1.3395 0.1761 -0.8913 1.6814
35300 New Haven-Milford CT 1.2037 0.3565 1.8353 0.3373 2.5200 0.3149
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner LA 1.4669 0.3827 1.8005 0.1997 0.3337 0.8483
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island NY-NJ-PA 26.7870 2.3289 1.9622 0.0708 0.7740 3.7219
35660 Niles-Benton Harbor MI 0.2272 4.2225 1.2195 0.4910 -0.3000 -0.7112
35980 Norwich-New London CT 0.3806 2.5282 1.3620 0.3834 2.4300 -0.4626
36100 Ocala FL 0.4625 26.5691 1.0121 0.4508 2.5900 0.0392
36140 Ocean City NJ 0.1373 1.0674 1.3332 0.6085 0.0700 -1.4334
36220 Odessa TX 0.1845 1.7012 1.1914 0.4434 2.5000 -1.1410
36260 Ogden-Clearfield UT 0.7379 7.3733 1.1369 0.3433 4.0883 0.3479
36420 Oklahoma City OK 1.6984 8.9525 1.2684 0.1702 0.1199 1.4212
36500 Olympia WA 0.3396 2.6762 1.2006 0.5266 3.3200 -0.5078
36540 Omaha-Council Bluffs NE-IA 1.1815 4.6939 1.3147 0.1726 -1.6836 1.1351
36740 Orlando-Kissimmee FL 2.8935 9.3348 1.2989 0.1484 3.6792 1.6530
36780 Oshkosh-Neenah WI 0.2308 3.4099 1.1577 0.3631 -1.3700 -0.5731
36980 Owensboro KY 0.1596 5.0431 1.1735 0.4904 -0.9396 -0.9497
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura CA 1.1366 1.0892 1.5986 0.3101 11.1700 -0.0195
37340 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville FL 0.7633 7.0268 1.1556 0.3242 3.9300 0.3194
37460 Panama City-Lynn Haven FL 0.2335 3.9684 1.1138 0.4859 2.1500 -0.7925
37620 Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna WV-OH 0.2287 20.4051 1.0463 0.4824 -0.0229 -0.5302
37700 Pascagoula MS 0.2164 3.3176 1.2155 0.6623 0.1912 -0.7469
37860 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent FL 0.6455 10.5757 1.1044 0.3574 2.0978 0.3456
37900 Peoria IL 0.5285 6.0365 1.2920 0.2890 -2.5036 0.3764
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington PA-NJ-DE-MD 8.2969 5.0519 1.6274 0.1023 -0.6748 2.8345
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ 5.9500 13.0025 1.3310 0.1114 4.3136 2.4388
38220 Pine Bluff AR 0.1445 18.4953 1.0257 0.5508 -1.2731 -0.8725
38300 Pittsburgh PA 3.3537 10.5364 1.3663 0.1425 0.4012 2.0415
38340 Pittsfield MA 0.1848 0.0590 2.1213 0.7997 0.8100 -1.5454
38540 Pocatello ID 0.1247 18.4792 0.9326 0.5365 1.9030 -1.1149
38860 Portland-South Portland-Biddeford ME 0.7305 0.3729 1.6948 0.3868 0.9595 0.1744
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton OR-WA 3.0966 2.5795 1.4937 0.1534 2.8130 1.7475
38940 Port St. Lucie FL 0.5696 4.4925 1.2049 0.4656 5.1827 -0.0890
39100 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown NY 0.9537 57.5790 1.0783 0.3958 0.0107 0.8914
39140 Prescott AZ 0.3027 55.8791 0.9866 0.5665 5.2100 -0.4084
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River RI-MA 2.2790 1.8282 1.5584 0.2242 1.2849 1.3694
39340 Provo-Orem UT 0.7023 15.6423 1.1251 0.3378 3.0296 0.5132
39380 Pueblo CO 0.2200 33.0571 0.9327 0.5804 2.1100 -0.5738
39460 Punta Gorda FL 0.2176 4.7904 1.1345 0.6776 5.1000 -1.0319
39540 Racine WI 0.2777 2.6053 1.2397 0.5556 -0.5100 -0.5717
39580 Raleigh-Cary NC 1.4914 4.1913 1.3699 0.2143 -0.6762 1.1883
39660 Rapid City SD 0.1712 10.5487 1.0612 0.4558 -0.3579 -0.7024
39740 Reading PA 0.5722 12.9659 1.1918 0.3670 -0.7300 0.2974
39820 Redding CA 0.2554 5.9179 1.1467 0.4672 5.6900 -0.7588
39900 Reno-Sparks NV 0.5841 6.1702 1.2543 0.2685 6.7038 -0.0559
40060 Richmond VA 1.7268 11.1761 1.3350 0.1846 -0.9568 1.4730
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA 5.8104 104.4265 1.1829 0.1695 4.3817 2.5456
40220 Roanoke VA 0.4222 22.5390 1.0696 0.3012 0.9380 0.0199
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40340 Rochester MN 0.2578 7.1786 1.1296 0.3375 -3.3458 -0.2406
40380 Rochester NY 1.4670 9.7948 1.2412 0.1746 -0.6948 1.3292
40420 Rockford IL 0.5015 16.7848 1.0660 0.3553 -2.7901 0.3797
40580 Rocky Mount NC 0.2073 6.0239 1.1722 0.4688 -1.7475 -0.6464
40660 Rome GA 0.1361 17.3345 0.9911 0.6475 0.3300 -1.0785
40900 Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville CA 2.9770 4.8303 1.4313 0.1708 5.4091 1.5526
40980 Saginaw-Saginaw Township North MI 0.2880 16.5948 1.0391 0.3910 -3.3300 -0.0839
41060 St. Cloud MN 0.2642 12.5971 1.0450 0.4347 -3.0004 -0.1386
41100 St. George UT 0.1905 23.2639 0.9521 0.4957 2.5700 -0.7385
41140 St. Joseph MO-KS 0.1756 10.6024 1.0856 0.5409 -1.4641 -0.7059
41180 St. Louis MO-IL 3.9914 19.9079 1.2643 0.1312 -0.4277 2.3707
41420 Salem OR 0.5505 9.5532 1.1035 0.3850 3.4215 0.1330
41500 Salinas CA 0.5803 1.2221 1.5755 0.3426 9.2400 -0.5045
41540 Salisbury MD 0.1703 13.6356 1.0504 0.6063 -0.3934 -0.8133
41620 Salt Lake City UT 1.5660 5.5353 1.3497 0.1645 3.3545 1.1401
41660 San Angelo TX 0.1539 11.3999 1.0347 0.5001 1.5945 -0.9984
41700 San Antonio TX 2.8340 12.2914 1.2660 0.1656 2.1287 1.8188
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos CA 4.2351 1.5943 1.6748 0.1332 9.7800 1.4266
41780 Sandusky OH 0.1101 4.8876 1.0852 0.5651 -0.9100 -1.3725
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont CA 5.9848 0.3531 2.0490 0.1203 7.3604 1.6192
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA 2.5677 0.1447 2.1759 0.1526 5.5612 0.8121
42020 San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles CA 0.3736 2.4081 1.3821 0.3809 7.8700 -0.6538
42060 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta CA 0.5754 0.8643 1.5674 0.2810 10.9700 -0.5659
42100 Santa Cruz-Watsonville CA 0.3584 0.6286 1.5617 0.6419 8.4900 -1.0716
42140 Santa Fe NM 0.2035 0.1706 1.6987 0.6477 3.0200 -1.2264
42220 Santa Rosa-Petaluma CA 0.6612 1.8173 1.4210 0.3670 7.9300 -0.2054
42260 Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice FL 0.9783 8.0869 1.1622 0.2326 4.7123 0.5228
42340 Savannah GA 0.4688 9.2001 1.1068 0.3385 0.7595 0.0822
42540 Scranton–Wilkes-Barre PA 0.7822 62.6807 1.0069 0.2540 0.3497 0.7451
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue WA 4.7113 1.1719 1.7037 0.1332 4.6088 1.8885
42680 Sebastian-Vero Beach FL 0.1877 1.2555 1.2826 0.6381 4.7200 -1.2862
43100 Sheboygan WI 0.1630 3.2650 1.1820 0.4794 -0.3700 -1.0073
43300 Sherman-Denison TX 0.1689 20.5729 1.0063 0.7441 0.7800 -0.9061
43340 Shreveport-Bossier City LA 0.5518 0.5061 1.6557 0.2672 0.4263 -0.0654
43580 Sioux City IA-NE-SD 0.2033 6.7056 1.1070 0.3518 -1.6477 -0.5531
43620 Sioux Falls SD 0.3234 0.9176 1.4228 0.3194 -3.1981 -0.1810
43780 South Bend-Mishawaka IN-MI 0.4508 5.9962 1.2356 0.3487 -2.3182 0.1576
43900 Spartanburg SC 0.3923 11.2840 1.0951 0.3525 0.5200 -0.1066
44060 Spokane WA 0.6494 3.8173 1.1601 0.2893 1.3300 0.3953
44100 Springfield IL 0.2941 14.5944 1.0630 0.3680 -2.6215 -0.1150
44140 Springfield MA 0.9719 48.7269 1.0487 0.2673 -0.0296 0.9868
44180 Springfield MO 0.5980 42.4428 0.9814 0.3118 -0.1019 0.5377
44220 Springfield OH 0.2000 20.6803 0.9762 0.6353 -2.0300 -0.5560
44300 State College PA 0.2059 5.6983 1.2306 0.4912 -0.4000 -0.6733
44700 Stockton CA 0.9552 9.1216 1.2154 0.3999 4.7700 0.4709
44940 Sumter SC 0.1480 5.4151 1.1225 0.6486 0.4500 -1.1196
45060 Syracuse NY 0.9187 11.6878 1.1814 0.2285 -1.0878 0.9094
45220 Tallahassee FL 0.5016 15.0466 1.0808 0.3650 1.8418 0.1910
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL 3.8779 17.9295 1.1870 0.1303 4.0087 1.9781
45460 Terre Haute IN 0.2411 20.4346 1.0643 0.5363 -2.2437 -0.3093
45500 Texarkana TX 0.1911 11.9339 1.0554 0.4806 0.3401 -0.7535
45780 Toledo OH 0.9267 18.0928 1.1349 0.2156 -2.2985 0.9937
45820 Topeka KS 0.3256 22.9574 1.0514 0.3978 -1.2054 -0.0417
45940 Trenton-Ewing NJ 0.5203 1.6191 1.4344 0.3137 -0.8000 -0.1181
46060 Tucson AZ 1.3768 24.1671 1.1242 0.2328 4.0400 1.0965
46140 Tulsa OK 1.2895 5.5205 1.3491 0.1913 0.4138 1.0760
46220 Tuscaloosa AL 0.2922 7.7286 1.1972 0.3964 0.5956 -0.3554
46340 Tyler TX 0.2829 3.5960 1.2186 0.4075 0.7200 -0.5192
46540 Utica-Rome NY 0.4198 76.1905 0.9437 0.3637 -1.6177 0.3300
46660 Valdosta GA 0.1853 33.3007 0.9361 0.4890 0.4906 -0.6906
46700 Vallejo-Fairfield CA 0.5817 2.3184 1.3973 0.5800 5.8800 -0.2641
47020 Victoria TX 0.1620 1.9775 1.3235 0.5431 0.7132 -1.1395
47220 Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton NJ 0.2214 18.9165 1.0652 0.5472 0.3800 -0.6868
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News VA-NC 2.3615 6.6554 1.3267 0.1646 0.7721 1.5923
47300 Visalia-Porterville CA 0.6001 20.2186 1.1325 0.3309 5.6500 0.1024
47380 Waco TX 0.3248 14.4336 1.0447 0.3399 0.7600 -0.2405
47580 Warner Robins GA 0.1865 2.0361 1.2082 0.5774 -0.0400 -0.9647
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47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV 7.5546 2.1874 1.7644 0.1175 -0.5658 2.6267
47940 Waterloo-Cedar Falls IA 0.2325 4.0817 1.2037 0.3123 -3.6928 -0.3363
48140 Wausau WI 0.1850 8.5505 1.0743 0.4457 -3.3000 -0.5433
48260 Weirton-Steubenville WV-OH 0.1745 12.5561 1.0666 0.6507 -0.4289 -0.8395
48300 Wenatchee WA 0.1526 2.5064 1.2836 0.6415 1.1223 -1.0532
48540 Wheeling WV-OH 0.2071 27.1680 1.0011 0.5045 -0.0508 -0.6087
48620 Wichita KS 0.8491 7.0330 1.2276 0.2070 -0.5189 0.7748
48660 Wichita Falls TX 0.2109 3.6100 1.2650 0.4866 -0.0733 -0.7295
48700 Williamsport PA 0.1663 37.1189 0.9883 0.5359 0.3300 -0.8261
48900 Wilmington NC 0.4833 4.2397 1.2504 0.3689 0.8620 0.0454
49020 Winchester VA-WV 0.1725 8.0065 1.2012 0.8358 0.2643 -0.9449
49180 Winston-Salem NC 0.6594 3.7013 1.3302 0.2738 -0.3283 0.3418
49340 Worcester MA 1.1124 1.7596 1.5552 0.4121 0.2400 0.7079
49420 Yakima WA 0.3318 3.8343 1.2424 0.4012 1.4800 -0.2958
49620 York-Hanover PA 0.5994 20.5103 1.1115 0.4145 -0.5800 0.3817
49660 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman OH-PA 0.8125 37.2035 1.0470 0.2679 -2.2828 0.9348
49700 Yuba City CA 0.2337 1.2193 1.4215 0.9995 3.3821 -1.0057
49740 Yuma AZ 0.2713 45.4247 0.9541 0.3985 4.2400 -0.5236
Notes: See Appendix F.2 for additional details on computations.
XXX
